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Even before it emerged as an international power, the U.S. sought the practical end of protecting itself from traditional threats and the idealistic objective of expanding the circle of democratic states. Where an enemy has opposed democracy on ideological grounds — as the Soviet Union did — the practical and the idealistic have merged. Cold War military strategy aimed to keep the Soviet Union from enslaving the European states, with which we had our oldest and strongest relationships and which formed a potential Soviet Atlantic coast. U.S. maritime strategy supported this by forcing the Warsaw Pact to divert attention from the central front in Germany and by holding at risk some of the Soviet Union’s strategic assets.

The threat that replaced Soviet communism is far more complicated. In the foreseeable future, it combines armed religious zealotry of a kind with which the West has been unfamiliar since the late 17th century with the possibility of nuclear proliferation. On the horizon sits China, a growing economic power with a population of industrious millions and a stirring ambition for international recognition and supremacy. Enveloping all is the invisible: the predictable and constant challenge to America’s position as the world’s only great power, as well as the United States’ global dependence on untroubled access through the seas. As U.S. overall military strategy changes to include the civil, intelligence and reconstructive requirements of irregular warfare, maritime strategy can take an assertive role in confronting the most immediate problem, the radical Islamists. In its more traditional form, maritime strategy must simultaneously keep the peace in the western Pacific. Finally — and most difficult to demonstrate in domestic political terms — maritime strategy must retain the size and power needed to support America’s position as the world’s superpower.

The U.S. is not the first modern state to confront this sort of strategic crazy quilt. In the years after World War I, Britons decided that they had to choose between imperial defense and preparing for a second major war at their doorstep — on the European continent. They chose the former. Germany developed the airplane and tank, as well as creative tactical ideas about how to use the new weapons. Had it not been for American naval and industrial strength the result of Britain’s choice would likely have been catastrophic.

A trio of similar concrete challenges will confront the U.S. for at least the next 50 years. China — as well as northeast Asia’s decreasing security — represents a problem at our common doorstep, the Pacific, in whose coastal region live 16 percent of U.S. citizens. The Sino-American problem is traditional: conflicting ambitions. Our objective — to achieve an increasingly democratic world — confronts China’s, which is to achieve status as the global superpower. Not only does the long-term aim of a democratic, free and prosperous Asia rest on American strength in the west Pacific. So, increasingly, would the health of the world economy in the event of any number of imaginable convulsions: serious economic downturns, major political crises, large refugee flows and a radical reshuffling of alliances.

The second danger is the energy and aggressiveness of radical Islam that measures itself by the damage it can inflict on modern states. This will not dissipate even if the Iraqi insurgency is extinguished. The certainty of radical Islam’s spread and the possibility that its adherents will possess devastating weapons parallel, for most of the world, England’s early 20th century problem of assuring its empire’s security.

Finally — for now, not forever — America’s interest in remaining the world’s great power requires maritime strategy to anticipate other significant threats to national security. Even a cursory reading of Thucydides’ “History of the Peloponnesian War” reminds that combinations of weak, smaller powers can produce major headaches for great ones. Aspirant proliferators circle the globe. North Korea’s accession to nuclear power status might — and might not — become part of the larger issue of China’s future in northeast Asia. Russia’s geography, nuclear power and appetite assure its eventual return. Checking, deterring and containing these threats is first a function of effective maritime strategy. This stretches the need for effective applications of the national military strategy’s maritime component around the world, increasing America’s need for naval power at the same time that the accelerating cost of shipbuilding is shrinking the fleet.

The U.S. cannot safely ignore any of these problems. Nor can the threats be addressed by the same means.

East Asia, with its huge populations and growing economic strength, is in the midst of profound change. China’s political future, the possible reunification of the Korean peninsula, its emergence as a nuclear power and the effects of these events on relationships with Japan guarantee that America’s Cold War objective of preventing a single power from dominating Europe will move eastward in this nation’s foreign policy. Similar to its 20th century foreign policy in Europe, the U.S. has a large interest in preventing a sole power from dominating Asia. No single instrument contributes more toward accomplishing this than a powerful U.S. presence in the western Pacific. Without a strong navy, the U.S. will not be able to project power in that part of the world, where there remains unusual bipartisan agreement on the un-wisdom of participation in a land war.

Remaining active and visible in the western Pacific is as important for the U.S. as preparing to defend itself again in Europe should have been for Britain in the years after World War I. The Pacific is a large backyard. Its transformation into an area of China’s influence, especially so long as the government in Beijing remains communist or authoritarian, means a return to superpower competition. It is difficult to predict what kind of international order a Chinese global superpower would establish, but the character of the regime, its treatment of dissenters and minorities, as well as its threat to use force against independent Taiwan, remind the world that Beijing’s principles are different from those of the modern democracies.

The radical Islamists’ principles are profoundly different from ours. In their wide geographic dispersion, they represent the 21st century parallel to England’s empire. Most of the world’s more than 1 billion Muslims live in the large portion of the globe bordered in the south and east by Indonesia, by Morocco in the west and Kazakhstan to the north. The prospects are distant that moderate Muslim clerical or political leadership will challenge the jihadists’ embrace of violence or their hatred of the West and its separation of secular and religious life. Weak or brittle governments in Africa, and such difficult-to-govern archipelagic nations as Indonesia and the Philippines as well as limited Islamic fundamentalist political successes in countries from Nigeria to Malaysia, suggest that there will be more states, like Afghanistan under the Taliban, in which radical Islamists seek secure bases for their operations.

Preventing states from becoming a base for radical Islamists is not only an American strategic objective. NATO’s participation in Afghanistan demonstrates that U.S. allies also understand the risk of a return to Taliban rule. Many Muslim states border the world’s oceans. U.S. maritime strategy should take the fullest advantage of these states’ fortunate geography. The sea services should exploit their ability to apply soft power as well as the traditional sort. Establishing and solidifying good relations by providing medical and civil assistance promotes stability and encourages democratic development as it emphasizes our continued presence as a major force in the region. Such support offers an alternative to radical ideology. This effort should be extended inland as navigable rivers allow. Maritime strategy in the Muslim littoral should also reflect the sea services’ flexibility by increasing the effective range at which they can apply traditional power from sea to land.

India Central

The geographic pivot of the Muslim littoral is democratic India — with its minority population of 140 million Muslims. Their participation in an increasingly prosperous and successful democratic state would be persuasive far beyond the subcontinent in establishing the compatibility of Islam with democracy. A key element of U.S. maritime strategy’s focus on the Muslim littoral should be to draw India closer to the U.S. through increased military-to-military exercises, ship visits and cooperation with Indian authorities in civil assistance.

India is equally important in assuring the success of democracy in Asia. India’s long-standing enmity toward China represents a physical point of intersection between the maritime strategy’s focus on the western Pacific and its role in preventing the further spread of radical Islam. The two prongs of this strategy are complemented by the third, the U.S.’s unchanging requirement to demonstrate its willingness and capability to remain a global superpower. The most convincing demonstration of American will and reach is a navy large, powerful and flexible enough to apply effective force where U.S. interests are endangered.

Maritime Strategy — 1907 to 2050

“Think globally, act locally” applies to more than environmentalism. If we adopt a maritime strategy of coastal defense or surge capacity for one or two points of conflict in the world, we will be retreating from the vision of America’s role that Theodore Roosevelt advanced in ordering the White Fleet on its global circumnavigation in 1907. Combined operations with friendly and allied navies have great potential to increase collective security, but not if such naval coalitions are seen as America’s attempt to reduce its own naval role in the world. Others’ perception of the U.S. as a global power is directly and inextricably linked to everything the U.S. attempts, including our ability to destroy radical fanatics. If U.S. maritime strategy appears to retreat from the global reach it has exercised for the past century, our international standing, including America’s ability to provide global safe passage, will diminish. So will our ability to defeat the radical Islamists and help promote democracy and security in East Asia.

Maritime strategy for the first half of this century appears in the shape of a global trident. It must accomplish three large objectives: maintain America’s position as a great international oceanic power, focus traditional naval effort in the western Pacific as both a shield and potential sword to assure the region’s security, and apply soft power to the Muslim littoral while improving the useful range of traditional naval force.

By happy accident of religion, politics and geography, the three objectives are closely related. Successful maritime strategy in the Muslim littoral reinforces stability in the western Pacific. Muslim states or ones with large Muslim populations dot China’s borders and traditional sea routes to the south and west. A maritime strategy that promotes stability in these states supports the broad U.S. national objective of a healthy, prosperous, self-reliant periphery around China — just as a vigorous American naval presence in the western Pacific offers stability and an inducement to good behavior along China’s coast. Success in two prongs of the global trident toughens the third prong, the continuance of American international naval superiority.

The global trident requires significant changes to the Navy’s force structure, missions and training. Additional effort will have to be devoted both to recruiting naval personnel with language and cultural skills and to teaching and refreshing them. This will assist both in delivering civil/humanitarian assistance and in conducting the combined operations that offer participating nations greater security. The fleet’s ability to provide effective civil and humanitarian assistance will have to be developed far beyond its current level.

Carrots, however, do not always succeed without sticks. Changes to allow provision of more civil assistance missions must be matched by increases in surface ships’ ability to project power ashore at both the lower and upper ends of the spectrum of force. This should include use of naval special operations forces to assist in gathering intelligence and infiltrating terrorist networks. A parallel effort will have to be undertaken to increase naval forces’ ability to support joint operations in applying force from the seas independently of foreign bases.

The U.S.’ vulnerability to terrorism should encourage the military services to diversify rather than consolidate some bases. With significant military action in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the prospect of proliferation crises with Iran and North Korea, a serious disruption of critical fleet support services could have grave consequences for national security. Key logistical, personnel, communications and repair facilities should be identified. Where it will materially improve security they should be separated. Such geographic separation is a rare example of matching operational requirements to political advantage. Greater dispersion of naval facilities increases political support for the maritime strategy.

Thinking about Political Strategy

Of equal, or perhaps greater, potential political value, a maritime strategy whose civil/humanitarian assistance element depends significantly on regional expertise that does not currently exist within the fleet can reach out to the civilian world for its needs. This is an opportunity to forge valuable connections to communities around the nation as the sea services recruit personnel with useful language skills. It is an opportunity to develop strong links with effective, knowledgeable nongovernmental organizations that can advise, guide and perhaps even participate in providing civil/humanitarian assistance. It is a chance to develop substantive lasting relationships with academic communities around the nation whose regional expertise could be marshaled not only to assist the fleet, but to create a reliable base of knowledge within the U.S. government where no such independent source now exists. These connections would materially assist the fleet in its mission as they increased understanding of, and respect for, the sea services throughout a civilian population whose understanding of the military continues to recede.

A shift in maritime strategy will also affect external relations. When jihadists and local threats replaced the Soviet blue-water one, the seas were transformed from contested places to means of access to land. If maritime strategy succeeds in exploiting this access effectively, it will also help prevent international waters from returning to their previous contested status. Conducting effective joint operations from the sea — independently, that is, of foreign bases — is an ironclad measure of the ability to exploit access.

Maritime strategy will have to counter the predictable impression that an increasing U.S. national ability to bring immediately usable force from sea to shore equals a retreat from working together with allies and friends. A substantial increase in combined operations with friendly and allied foreign navies will go a long way toward assuring our partners that the U.S. has not decided to go it alone.

Beyond 2050

The last time a powerful Muslim fleet put to sea was in the late 16th century, at the dawn of the scientific/technological advances that separated the European Enlightenment states from the old world of faith that is the beacon of today’s radical Islamists. A contemporary successor to the early Ottoman imperial navy is unlikely. But, access to off-the-shelf technology including anti-ship missiles, extremely quiet submarines, the probability of acquiring weapons of mass destruction and help from the most technologically advanced Muslim states — such as Iran — could threaten shipping in nearby waters.

Maritime strategy must not discount this. Coastal threats from nations or groups can concentrate their energy entirely on keeping an intruder out of a very limited swath of ocean. They are bound neither by a great power’s need for flexible, mission-spanning maritime forces nor by Western militaries’ respect for life. The necessity for safe navigation is unconnected to whether threats materialize on the high seas or within hailing distance of coasts or choke points. The ability to transport commerce and military forces is an unchanging part of maritime strategy because it is an unchanging requirement of U.S. national strategy.

The radicals offer faith and obedience to God’s will rather than rational ideas as an alternative to modern liberal democracy. It is unlikely that history will reverse its direction: Science, technology, the ability to create wealth and equality — especially of women — will eventually defeat the radical Islamists, although it is impossible to reckon the cost to our own society. Their defeat will not return the contest for control of the seas to the unusual great power competition of Jutland, the Battle of the Atlantic and the Cold War. Even, perhaps especially, with an ascendant China, U.S. maritime strategy can usefully apply what it learns from civil/humanitarian assistance in the Muslim littoral to other large regions that will grow in strategic importance decades from now — such as Africa.

The disappearance of the Soviets was a reminder that flanks and strategic centers change and sometimes even reverse themselves. The prong of the global trident that supports America’s continued position as an international superpower is more than a string of port visits and foreign port photo opportunities. The accession to nuclear status of North Korea and Iran raises again the question of how many simultaneous conflicts the U.S. is able to handle; the actual use of proliferated nuclear weapons would press it much harder. Maritime strategy’s ability to divert, maneuver and engage allows it to play a supporting, or even a leading position, in answering these and other predictable questions.

Out of the United States’ fundamental interest in preventing the domination of Asia by a single power emerges maritime strategy’s western Pacific component. America’s equally compelling interest in retaining its international military pre-eminence dictates a global fleet. Preventing radical and armed Islam from deadly metastasis pushes the adaptive strength of maritime strategy logically toward engagement in the Muslim littoral. These three prongs address immediate dangers, those that follow and what can confidently be expected beyond. This is not a coincidence. Effective strategy should be sufficiently elastic to cover geographic and political as well as temporal facts.

The maritime strategy of the late Cold War was fashioned when the West lived under a much larger threat — if less likely than today’s nuclear threat. Emphasis on articulating maritime strategy as a foundation of national policy shriveled after the Soviet Union ended, in large measure because of civilian leadership’s preoccupation with other issues. But the U.S.’s geography didn’t change. Our placement between the world’s great oceans remains fundamental to how we protect ourselves. Now, events have revived interest in maritime strategy. It’s the right time for a public discussion of these issues, a debate that could result in agreement about fundamentals that will serve the U.S. well because the fundamentals will last.