subscribe  |    email  |    print  |    continue the debate

Within two months of taking over as chief of the British Army, Chief of the General Staff, Gen. Richard Dannatt sent political fur flying by saying the unspeakable publicly: All was not well in Iraq, and it was unlikely to get any better with current policies.

Dannatt, in an interview given to a popular British tabloid, said what had been on the lips of most thinking people for some time. He called for British troops to be withdrawn from Iraq soon or risk the consequences to Iraq and to Western society. He said the continuing presence of British troops in Iraq exacerbated the security problems, and that a moral and spiritual vacuum had been created in Iraq, allowing malign elements to move in. This, in turn, has allowed an Islamist threat to grow in the United Kingdom and elsewhere.

Dannatt added that history would show that the planning was poor for what would happen in Iraq after the initial successful war-fighting phase, probably based more on optimism than sound strategy. The original intentions of putting in place a pro-West, liberal democracy that would be an exemplar for the region and might have a beneficial effect on the balance in the Middle East was naive and unobtainable. The only hope now of leaving Iraq with any dignity was through a lower ambition. He reminded politicians that the coalition is in a Muslim country, and that Muslim views of foreigners are quite clear: As a foreigner you can be welcomed into a country. But the coalition was not invited. Indeed, the military campaign in 2003 effectively kicked the door in.

Dannatt contrasted this situation with that of Afghanistan, where the coalition remains at the invitation of the Afghan government. He said he was confident that, given the right resources — and the will — the coalition will get it right in Afghanistan. But that papers over some pretty deep cracks in the Afghanistan coalition. Nations have different views of the constitution of the coalition, differing rules of engagement, and different political wills and motivations for defeating the Taliban and bringing a lasting peace.

Putting together a coalition of the willing to undertake peacekeeping operations or to undertake more forceful operations has always been difficult. Nations will generally join such a group only if it is to their advantage, whether political, financial or induced by pressure from other nations.

For as long as a mission is clear, legal and not open-ended, the coalition stands a reasonable chance of remaining intact, and of achieving its objectives. However, in the case of Iraq, and to an extent, Afghanistan, none of those requirements remains. Some nations have already left, and others are beginning to wonder how and when to exit without it appearing like they’ve cut and run. In those circumstances, joining future coalitions is not uppermost in nations’ thinking.

The reason Dannatt’s comments are so important to Iraq, Afghanistan, and future coalitions and campaigns is that it is virtually unheard of for a military chief of a major nation in a coalition to voice publicly views that are at odds with his political masters.

Service chiefs have a responsibility to support the policy of the government of their country. But what if that policy is based on false foundations? What if the policy is based on asking the military to undertake activities that make no military sense? During crisis management operations mounted in the 1990s, politicians asked for military advice and then took that advice when formulating their policies. Thus, the military was, in the main, given tasks that were realistic, achievable and, most important, had an end game with an exit strategy.

I have little doubt that when it was decided, politically, that the U.K. would support the U.S. in its invasion of Iraq, the service chiefs of the time asked what the plan was for after war fighting, and what was the exit strategy.

The Bosnia crisis taught us that nations are built of a number of sects, tribes or ethnic groups. Allow them freedom, and each group will want self-rule or at least self-determination. Yugoslavia was made up of Serbs, Croats and Muslims. After years of fighting, they now have their own countries. Iraq is made up of Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds. It has so far proved unsustainable to hold them together in a single country, and the lower ambition referred to by Dannatt is likely to be some loose federation of separate communities. This has been argued for at least the past two years by the military, diplomats and intelligence services.

As casualties mount and the Iraq war becomes increasingly unpopular at home, could it be that British and American politicians are also looking for a way to ditch their one-country liberal democracy policy in favor of something more realistic and achievable?

President Bush has looked increasingly uncomfortable as more journalists use White House press conferences to push him on the future plans for Iraq. Although the president has tried to hold to his usual robust line, his words are increasingly giving the administration more wriggle room. For example, Bush made it clear that Iraqi leaders would have to take more responsibility for security matters because “American patience is not unlimited.”

The war has driven, and continues to drive, Muslims into the anti-U.S. and anti-West radical camps. Hard-line Muslims are using the war to ferment anti-U.S. and anti-Western views. Even moderate Muslims are questioning the logic of an occupation that has set Shiites against Sunnis and both sects against the U.S. and U.K. The military and the intelligence community understand the downward spiral we are in. The longer the coalition remains in Iraq, the more unrest will grow, the more the fundamentalists’ power base will grow, and the more likely it will be that terrorist attacks will be mounted in the U.S., the U.K. and other Western countries. The military coalition has turned from being the solution to being a part of the Iraq problem.

The British Army is at full stretch. The force sent into Afghanistan was not robust enough. The Taliban have seen off bigger invaders (as they see it) many times before.

Traditionally, as American presidents and British prime ministers reach the end of their terms, their interests turn to their place in history and how they will be remembered and judged. It will have escaped neither Bush nor Prime Minister Tony Blair that, despite the many good achievements of both men, the judgment of history is likely to be all about the crisis that is Iraq.

Judgment of history

Thus came the hour; came the man. Dannatt voiced what those before him had not dared to say — at least not until they had retired. We are fighting a war in Iraq that is unwinnable, to achieve an aim that is unobtainable, with resources that do not match policy. While Blair was initially forced to support his service chief, recent comments have been aimed at finding some solution that allows the U.K. to leave Iraq in an orderly fashion and in the near, rather than distant, future. By the end of October, informed sources were saying that the government policy was moving toward leaving Iraq within a year, allowing British forces to concentrate on the Afghanistan conflict.

It is noteworthy that within a short time of Dannatt’s newspaper interview, both Blair and Bush seemed to move their policies more into line with the views he expressed. Conspiracy theories will abound in higher government circles, but it is interesting that both countries have moved so far and so fast at this time — and Dannatt, quite rightly, still has his job.

In the U.S., retired generals have been equally vociferous in their condemnation of the current policies toward Iraq. Indeed, even serving generals have begun to be more open in their views. Gen. George Casey, the Iraq commander, stated that his command was not achieving its targets for lowering violence. Why do the generals suddenly feel the need to voice their opinions? The answer, in part, goes back to the Vietnam War, where an unwinnable campaign deteriorated rapidly and U.S. forces had to leave in a less than orderly fashion. They do not want a repeat in Iraq.

However, predominately, the generals feel that the U.S. forces have done all that was asked of them. They had a good war-fighting plan that was well executed and well delivered — but there was scant follow-up, little political will to rebuild Iraq, and a lack of political understanding of the dynamics of Iraq and its place in the Middle East. The military has been left to pick up the pieces in an increasingly volatile and bloody civil war between the sects in Iraq. The Iraqi Army and police force were disbanded soon after liberation, throwing many thousands of young men onto the streets with nothing to do — a sure recipe for violence. The generals undoubtedly blame the administration for this situation. They see an end game approaching and are determined that the military should not become the political scapegoat.

In Afghanistan, the coalition can make a real difference, but until it is possible to put more troops on the ground, the Taliban will not be defeated. Of equal importance, Afghanistan needs rebuilding to sustain a long-term development. Without that rebuilding, more and more Afghans will move their allegiance to the Taliban. The classic example is that of the opium poppy trade, which has escalated dramatically since the Taliban crisis began. There are not enough troops to destroy the crops, and not enough reconstruction or aid to give the farmers something else from which to earn their living.

The Afghanistan coalition has been difficult to build and to sustain. Arguably, this is a direct result of the Iraq crisis, where nations have seen that they were asked to go to war on questionable pretexts, with no long-term plausible strategy, no exit strategy and no financial relief. The result has been that the Afghanistan coalition has only the usual two active participants: the Americans and the British. Other nations are there but generally do not participate in active operations outside Kabul. In the past few months, NATO and the United Nations have had their appeals for more troops to be deployed into Afghanistan met with only a limited response.

Over the past five to 10 years, the West has failed to create plausible strategies to underpin military operations. Troops have been committed round the world without regard for reality and without a coherent vision of what is achievable. Dannatt brought this to the surface and perhaps has given military chiefs (and planners) their pride, teeth and ability to help formulate practical government policy.

So where are we now?

Iraq has made it difficult to form and hold together coalitions. As nations reach their agreed end date, they leave. Afghanistan has a higher appeal, although the specter of the Russian attempt to subjugate Afghanistan is always in the mind. Nations have committed forces in what they see as a just adventure, but many have stopped short of allowing their forces to take on the Taliban in the countryside.

Lebanon proved a difficult coalition to put together. The French stated at the time that they did not wish to commit themselves to an open-ended engagement, where no lasting peace between Israel and Hezbollah was in sight. It’s a valid concern.

Darfur has been, and is, a humanitarian disaster on an enormous scale. The African Union was charged with forming a coalition, but in putting together a small force, it found that nations from that region are unwilling or unable to undertake such a mission. As a result, interethnic institutionalized murder and rape continue on a vast scale, with the Sudan government unwilling to allow a more robust force to be deployed, even if it were possible to put one together.

What of North Korea and perhaps Iran? If it were to be suggested that action against these nations should be undertaken, would it be even vaguely possible to form a coalition? With no military alternatives, where does that leave Western policies?

Most agree there is a need for the civilized world to have the capability to put together an international force to undertake peace and stability missions. But international coalitions are in crisis and nations have become highly reluctant to commit their forces. The solution lies in coordinated political/military strategic planning, based on legality and backed up with political will and positive leadership. A model for the future could be that all coalitions would be led by international organizations such as the U.N. or NATO.

A positive strategy must be in place, a strategy that properly takes into account military and political plans. Military plans should be aimed at producing an environment within which reconstruction and democracy can thrive. Political plans should ensure that no vacuum is left, and that a positive and achievable road map is in place before any military force is deployed. And then there’s that awkward but ever-critical question of an exit strategy.