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The Defense Department is modernizing and transforming itself into a force designed to dominate all challengers in any future battle. At the heart of this transformation is the concept of network-centric warfare, which seeks to exploit technology and link dispersed war-fighting platforms, soldiers and a vast array of intelligence assets and sensors, with various means of attack. Although some components of the Defense Department’s efforts are outstanding and promise significant advantage to future American forces, other elements are so far off the mark that if remedial actions are not taken, American forces could suffer a significant battlefield defeat in a future war.

Our defense modernization program had its genesis in the aftermath of Operation Desert Storm in 1991. Before the initiation of hostilities, the Iraqi Army was widely portrayed in the media as a menacing force, hardened by years of war with Iran, loaded with thousands of tanks and artillery pieces, and protected by a sophisticated web of modern air-defense weapons. When the U.S.-led coalition utterly routed Saddam Hussein’s forces from Kuwait, the victory was widely viewed as a product of America’s technological prowess and heralded the beginnings of a revolution in military affairs (RMA). The years that followed saw an abundance of articles written by military thinkers who shared their vision of what this revolution would mean for the U.S. and how it would transform the way wars were fought. A number of prominent flag officers in the Defense Department led the way.

One of the initial proponents of RMA theory was Adm. William A. Owens, at the time vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In February 1996, he wrote “The Emerging U.S. System-of-Systems,” in which he laid out his vision of future warfare that would rely heavily on technology and feature the RMA prominently. That was followed a few years later by then-Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric Shinseki, who announced his intent to make Owens’ ideas operational in the form of a “family of systems” known as Future Combat Systems (FCS). The ideas laid out by these two men, and effectively adopted as Defense Department policy in a series of documents published shortly after, established the conceptual underpinning that would later be used to create the future force. Some components of this high-tech vision are demonstrably outstanding, while others, regrettably, are decidedly not.

The U.S. Army senior leadership articulated its vision of what the future Army would be capable of in the 2004 Army Transformation Roadmap: “Knowledge-based Army forces exploit advanced information technologies and space-based assets for network-enabled battle command, while fully integrated within the joint, interagency and multinational environment. Unlike past, predictable operations, Army forces respond within days and fight on arrival in the joint operations area through multiple entry points. These capabilities allow the JFC [joint forces commander] to pre-empt enemy actions, assure access, seize the initiative and shape the battle space.”

But given the current state of technology, the probability of future development in nations across the globe, and a historical perspective on the performance of new and emerging technologies in the past, does this theory stand up to rigorous examination? I argue that it does not. Aside from a near-faith-based, unsubstantiated belief in the efficacy of technology to do anything and everything imaginable, one of the primary factors upon which this assessment is based is its failure to give proper consideration to the capabilities of the future enemy force.

One of the major problems in discussing the foundations for our modernization program is that the very military victory hailed as the proof of American technological dominance — Desert Storm (and later the conventional phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom) — was not primarily a result of technology. It resulted from a combination of two factors: (1) the American force was highly trained, well-led and effectively equipped; and (2) the Iraq force was pathetically led, even more poorly trained and marginally equipped. In other words, no matter what we did in Desert Storm and OIF, the U.S. would have won. Had we faced a competent foe, we may well have won anyway, but we would have seen the limits of technology. As it is, we cite Desert Storm as unimpeachable proof of the dominant ability of our current military technology, and most of our projections about future capability envision an enemy as impotent as Iraq. Our failure to create a force based on facing a credible, robust and capable enemy force that has access to modern technology and is as clever as we are in its deadly application is one of the greatest failures of our modernization program.

UNPROTECTED AND UNREALISTIC

But the greatest threat such an unrealistic view of combat poses to our future force is the misguided decision to reduce both the amount of armor protection for the fighting vehicles and the number of vehicles themselves without any substantive data.

Army plans call for the creation of 15 FCS brigade combat teams (FBCTs) by 2030. Each of these FBCTs will be composed of 14 systems, including manned and unmanned ground vehicles, two classes of unmanned aerial systems (UAS), a comprehensive network, plus the soldier (for a detailed description of the entire FCS system, see the Army FCS Web site at http:// www.army.mil/fcs). In the perfectly valid interest of lowering logistical requirements, the Army chose to use a common chassis for all FCS vehicles. The consequence of that decision was the design of vehicles that are less armored than existing platforms and therefore less survivable in combat, which is illogical when one considers the certainty that time and technology will continue to see the development of stronger and more powerful weapon systems. How then, does it make sense to design a future fighting platform less survivable than today’s vehicles? Consider recent combat experience in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The enemy in both of those wars is not a shell of the powerful future enemy we may someday face, and yet this decidedly low-tech, insurgent enemy has been able to scrounge for sufficient numbers of powerful roadside weapons that have forced the U.S. to spend hundreds of billions of dollars to add armor to every combat vehicle in our inventory — including the 70-ton M1 Abrams tank and the 30-ton Bradley Fighting Vehicle. If we recognize the need to upgrade the armor protection on the vehicles in our fleet that already possess the greatest degree of protection, what logic could lead one to conclude that it makes sense to develop lighter vehicles, possessing less armored protection, potentially going up against a state equipped with a full arsenal of modern weapons? The Defense Department’s apparent answer: Information.

PAINFUL LESSON 1

Operation Anaconda conducted against al-Qaida in Afghanistan in March 2002 provides painful lessons about the limitations of technology. In a paper for the Army War College, then-Lt. Col. H.R. McMaster described the key points of that battle: “On March 2, infantry air assaulted almost directly on top of undetected enemy positions. Soldiers came under immediate fire from small arms, mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, and machineguns as their helicopters landed. Battalion and brigade command posts were pinned down and commanders fought alongside their men. Apache helicopters responding to provide direct fire support were hit and rendered inoperable. The planned second lift of soldiers had to be cancelled. Some units were pinned down by enemy fire during the first night of the battle and through the next day; they, including many of the wounded, could not be extracted until the following night. The unit had deployed with no artillery under the assumption that surveillance combined with precision fires from the air would be adequate. Even the most precise bombs proved ineffective against small, elusive groups of enemy infantry so soldiers relied heavily on small mortars. As the fight developed over the next ten days, it became apparent that over half of the enemy positions and at least three hundred fifty al Qaeda fighters had gone undetected.”

It is reasonable to ask how, 11 years after Desert Storm, with billions of dollars spent on refining the technological advances so touted a decade earlier, we encountered such stiff resistance against an enemy that had no UAVs, no access to satellites, no armored vehicles, no digitized battle command network, no helicopters and very little in the way of sophisticated weaponry.

Since the early 1990s, senior military leaders have been preaching what amounts to a faith-based belief in the efficacy of future technology. We are always told that “soon” we will see “unprecedented” capabilities as a result of technology, and that our troops, so equipped, will enjoy “overmatch” against any opponent. However, when it has come to combat operations in which theory has met reality, a different story has emerged.

PAINFUL LESSON 2

An equally problematic encounter occurred during the initial march to Baghdad by our mechanized forces. One of the leading elements of the 3rd Infantry Division (3ID) drive to Baghdad, Lt. Col. Ernest Marcone, battalion commander in 3ID’s 69th Armored Regiment, approached a key bridge over the Euphrates River that would be necessary for the advance to the capital by the remainder of the division. Every technological advantage should have belonged to Marcone’s armor battalion, particularly with respect to intelligence of enemy movements. The Iraqi enemy had access to no satellites, limited radio communications, no UAVs, no fighter jets, no helicopters and only rudimentary command-and-control technology.

The U.S. side was equipped with unprecedented technology. During the war, hundreds of aircraft- and satellite-mounted motion sensors, heat detectors, and image and communications eavesdroppers hovered above Iraq. The armed services coordinated their actions as never before. U.S. commanders in Qatar and Kuwait enjoyed 42 times the bandwidth available to their counterparts in the first Persian Gulf War. High-bandwidth links were set up for intelligence units in the field. A new vehicle-tracking system marked the location of key U.S. fighting units and even allowed text e-mails to reach front-line tanks. This digital firepower convinced many in the Pentagon that the war could be fought with a far smaller force than the one it expected to encounter. If ever there was going to be overmatch, it should have been here. But as in Afghanistan, when theory met reality in combat, reality prevailed because even a technologically overmatched enemy has a vote in the outcome.

As Marcone’s battalion approached the bridge, he was unable to get intelligence on the nature of the threat he might face. According to a November 2004 article in Technology Review, “How Technology Failed in Iraq,”as the battle developed, “the situation grew threatening. Marcone arrayed his battalion in a defensive position on the far side of the bridge and awaited the arrival of bogged-down reinforcements. One communications intercept did reach him: a single Iraqi brigade was moving south from the airport. But Marcone says no sensors, no network, conveyed the far more dangerous reality, which confronted him at 3:00 a.m. April 3. He faced not one brigade but three: between 25 and 30 tanks, plus 70 to 80 armored personnel carriers, artillery, and between 5,000 and 10,000 Iraqi soldiers coming from three directions.”

Because the American soldiers were so well-trained and well-equipped, in both cases they were able to overcome the uncertainty created by the failure of technology. In our current force, soldiers don’t expect to have all the information. They are explicitly trained to expect that intelligence reports are approximations, and that once contact is made they discover ground truth, adapt to the situation presented and still expect to prevail. In the future force, however, it will be far more difficult for soldiers to overcome inaccurate or incomplete intelligence reports because the platforms in which they’ll fight are physically less capable of surviving direct-fire engagements in combat.

The concept of our future ground force is such that it trades armor protection for enhanced information, positing that with dominant battlespace knowledge, we will know where the enemy is and what he is doing, and take pre-emptive action against him. Thus, we always gain and maintain the initiative, keeping enemy forces continually off balance and on the defensive.

But as these two critical tactical vignettes show, the other side is quite capable; the technology upon which we primarily base our intelligence, communication and precision strike capabilities will not always do what we hope; and at other times, circumstances simply will not be in our favor. If we do not have a force like Marcone had at that Euphrates bridge — heavily armored tanks and infantry fighting vehicles that enabled him to fight for information in an uncertain environment — then we will at times be at a disadvantage against an enemy who is so equipped.

MODERNIZATION’S MISMATCHES

To ensure, therefore, our future force does not encounter a situation in which it is overmatched by an enemy force, we must conduct a thorough force-on-force analysis of potential future opponents. Only by making a direct comparison to these forces can one hope to determine whether the correct course of action has been taken in terms of future development. Without question, the country that currently possesses the most robust military capability and is investing most heavily for the future is the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

This article takes no position on the likelihood of whether the PRC and the U.S. ever will go to war, but addresses the capabilities that these two giants possess now and are likely to possess in the future and illuminates potential Chinese advantages over future American forces.

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA), in an effort to create combat forces with the ability to effectively execute China’s emerging modernization doctrine, has been improving its training in terms of realism and sophistication with a focus on joint and combined-arms operations. In recent years, China has increased the difficulty of training exercises by presenting its leaders with unexpected problems. In January, the PLA General Staff Department (GSD) issued its 2007 Training Guidelines, which emphasize realism.

It is clear that China’s doctrine and supporting training programs are focused on precisely the capabilities the U.S. possesses now and is likely to have in the future. China has also invested heavily in the weapon systems needed to attack American vulnerabilities. China has aggressively produced an entire array of high-tech systems and advanced weapons designed to attack areas of American vulnerability, particularly in regard to FCS. It is for this reason we must be cautious when touting the strengths of the system; we must not fail to take into consideration that other intelligent people are actively engaged in seeking ways to defeat U.S. military capabilities.

MADE IN AMERICA — AND EVERYWHERE ELSE

The world has not stood passively by since Desert Storm. It has studied American performance in extraordinary detail and spent billions of dollars and years of research focused on the desire to defeat the most prominent capabilities we have now and those we are projected to have in the future. We, therefore, must be sober and aware of what capabilities the world is producing, expend considerable mental power trying to devise counteractions and, perhaps above all, shed the hubris endemic throughout our force that would have us believe we cannot possibly be challenged on a conventional battlefield. The facts argue persuasively against such belief.

It is critical that with eyes wide open, we educate ourselves as to global military developments, analyze those capabilities in light of our platforms and systems, ascertain our areas of potential vulnerability — and then constantly seek ways to mitigate those vulnerabilities, acknowledge that our opponent will score some victories, and with that understanding, seek solutions that will allow us to win anyway. If we always prepare ourselves to face the best capabilities a potential enemy might throw at us, we will have a chance to win every time.

Ironically, the Defense Department claims to use such a “capabilities-based” approach to future force development. According to Defense’s 2002 Annual Report to the President and the Congress, although it is impossible to know which state or group of states might pose a future threat to the U.S. or its vital national interests, it is possible “to anticipate the capabilities that an adversary might employ to coerce its neighbors, deter the U.S. from acting in defense of its allies and friends, or directly attack the U.S. or its deployed forces. A capabilities-based model ... requires identifying capabilities that U.S. military forces will need to deter and defeat. ... Because such adversaries are looking for U.S. military vulnerabilities and building capabilities to exploit them, the department is shoring up potential weak spots to close off such avenues of attack.” If actions followed these words, then this essay would be hailing the Defense Department’s focus. Unfortunately, there is a significant mismatch between stated policy and actions.

In the 2004 Army Transformation Roadmap, the Army defines “Future Challenge Risk” as “anticipating future threats and adjusting capabilities to maintain a military advantage against them.” And yet when it explicitly defines this risk in relation to the FCS, it lists three ways by which it will attain this goal: providing program stability through testing and procurement; spiraling capabilities forward; and accelerating the fielding of an intelligence distribution system. There is no mention of any analysis of current or emerging enemy capabilities.

It is my assessment that the three essential enemy capabilities the U.S. must focus on are:

å Future adversaries who possess rapidly evolving technological capabilities that will soon — and in some key categories already do — give them skills equal to those of the U.S. These categories include (but are not limited to) deployed satellite constellations for navigation, intelligence-gathering, communication, and telemetry for precision-guided weapons; the ability to shoot down U.S. satellites, deploy fleets of unmanned aerial systems and field increasingly modern fighter jets and bombers; and advanced C4ISR capabilities.

å Future adversaries who are developing increasingly powerful armored vehicles, particularly main battle tanks designed to go head to head with the M1 Abrams tank, along with more sophisticated anti-tank guided missiles, precision-fired artillery pieces and advanced rotary-winged aircraft designed to allow them to compete on the conventional battlefield against the U.S.

å Future adversaries who seek to mitigate U.S. strengths by fighting in cities, intermingling with civilian populations; make use of new and existing signature-reduction technology; discover creative ways to deceive our expansive sensor array; and employ robust countertechnology forces designed to interfere with, deceive, corrupt and destroy U.S. computer and communication systems; and aggressively seek to shoot down UAVs.

Our future force is designed to go against an enemy who has only a few of the capabilities listed above; if unforeseen circumstances in the future were to require it to fight against an enemy who is able to do most of the things on the above list, our force would be vulnerable to defeat. The U.S. should, therefore, shift course immediately and embark on a path expressly designed to create a military able to defeat the best that any enemy could throw at us, endure a bloody nose (because it must be clearly understood that a worthy opponent can inflict lethal blows), and provide the means to win despite his best efforts. To accomplish that objective, the Defense Department in general and the Army in particular must make changes to its futures programs.

OUR BEST CHANCE

Making recommendations for change does not imply we would junk all the modernization efforts conducted to date by the Defense Department or the Army. Many — indeed, most — elements of current modernization are good to excellent, both in theory and practice. For example, Army senior leaders are correct in their assessment that the global trend is clearly moving toward network-enabled forces that use sensors, unmanned aerial platforms, satellites, precision-guided weapons, and other advanced computer and communications gear; as an economic and military superpower, the U.S. must ensure it remains the world leader in this movement. Moreover, a number of elements of the FCS program ought to be supported and in some cases expanded. Several classes of robot vehicles already have demonstrated notable utility in combat; the non-line-of-sight launch system, mortar and cannon all provide significant improvements over existing capabilities. The concept of linking platforms via an integrated network is sound. Linking sensor fields with aerial platforms and soldier observations enables the forces to attack targets outside direct-fire range and provides the Army with the ability to increase lethality.

Although many aspects of the FCS system have great potential, significant vulnerabilities also exist. Problems arise when the network experiences latency or when the enemy force successfully attacks the UAVs, disables or destroys the sensors, knocks down the satellites, successfully employs camouflage, deceives the sensors, or employs a mass attack that can’t be destroyed fast enough. In such cases, the FCS system as designed would be at a marked disadvantage because, stripped of its ability to engage beyond line of sight and out of contact, it could not trade body blows with a heavily armored enemy and survive. The first step in rectifying this deficiency must be either to increase significantly the armor protection of the Mounted Combat System (FCS’ main direct-fire system) or expressly produce a new tank for the FBCT that can go head to head with high quality systems such as the Ukrainian T84U, the Chinese Type 99 and/or the Russian Black Eagle.

BRING BACK THE CAVALRY

One of the most significant errors committed during Army reorganization was the elimination of the heavy divisional cavalry squadron. Before being disbanded, this organization was composed of three ground troops equipped with 27 tanks, 41 Bradleys and six mortars, and two aerial reconnaissance troops equipped with 16 OH-58 Scout helicopters. This formation had the ability to conduct reconnaissance in any environment conceivable. If bad weather, poor intelligence or just the fog of war clouded the situation, the squadron could develop the situation for the supported maneuver commander so that when he had to engage the enemy, he had an adequate picture of the enemy. As programmed, FCS has replaced this robust formation with what’s known as an RSTA (reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition) squadron composed of four platoons of UAVs and two aerial reconnaissance troops composed of 10 scout helicopters.

Within each combined-arms brigade there exists a lightly armored ground reconnaissance troop, but the RSTA squadron has no ground troops, only aerial assets. In an ideal environment, these platforms would be able to provide valuable information to the maneuver commander but would have only a limited ability to thoroughly conduct route reconnaissance, limited capability to find enemy forces making effective use of camouflage, and no ability to engage enemy forces with direct fire. But the biggest weakness of all is its susceptibility to being grounded by bad weather and shot down by enemy anti-air assets.

During both Desert Storm and OIF, significant dust storms covered the battle area at the most inopportune times, grounding virtually all tactical UAVs and helicopters. That did not represent a serious problem to the Army’s ground forces in either war because they possessed a sufficiently robust and powerful armored reconnaissance force with which to fight for information. I fought with the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment at the Battle of 73 Easting in a blinding sandstorm in 1991. We would have preferred to have had the aero scouts flying the normal six to 10 kilometers in front of us, but their absence represented limited concern to us because our ground troops found the enemy and had enough indigenous firepower and armored protection to survive any unexpected encounter. Had an FCS-equipped force run into the same sandstorm, all its aerial platforms would have been grounded, denying the supported maneuver force commander of information about enemy disposition or strength and requiring him to engage blindly. It is critical, then, that the reconnaissance squadron be reorganized to include ground troops equipped with the ability to fight for information when conditions are not optimal. To go into combat in the future with vulnerable reconnaissance capability would be unwise.

Virtually every competent armed force possesses unmanned aerial systems, and a growing number possess the ability to attack space-based platforms. Therefore, we must create the ability within our force to both defend against such attacks and to launch counterstrikes. Like it or not, space has been added as a dimension of war. Our potential adversaries possess the ability to shoot down, blind, deceive or outright destroy the space platforms upon which we critically rely. If we don’t protect our satellites and improve our ability to employ precision weapons against hostile enemy forces, we incur an avoidable, unacceptable vulnerability.

THE ESSENTIAL UAV

Because of its effect on the tactical and operational fight, the UAV has become a key asset of the battlefield commander. In the context of global force modernization, most discussion to date about UAVs has centered on their ability to perform ISR and precision strike functions, but there has been far too little discussion regarding counter-UAV operations. If it is agreed that the UAV is a valuable tool used by both sides in an operation, it stands to reason then that there is also value in denying this ability to our opponent. Just as a common part of a conventional battle plan on the ground is the counter-reconnaissance phase to identify enemy intentions and strip away enemy reconnaissance assets, likewise it now must become a requirement to conduct counter-UAV operations to identify enemy intentions/capabilities and to strip away the enemy’s fleet of drones and blind him to our intentions.

We must, therefore, develop a UAV variant whose purpose it is to seek out and destroy enemy platforms. When one considers that China has virtually identical UAV variants to the FCS’ Class I and IV vehicles, it becomes clearer why it is important to develop this counter-UAV capability. If we believe the possession of these platforms serves a critical function in precision-fire engagements, then it becomes all the more important to deny the enemy the ability to target our force with same.

But although the UAV has importance at the tactical and operational level, satellites have great significance to the joint force commander at the strategic level. The loss of UAVs might affect companies, battalions and brigades; the loss of satellites affects a nation’s entire force. We need redundant capabilities, and we must not rely exclusively on those assets to perform critical functions. We need to employ things such as stationary inflatables, remotely piloted vehicles and other alternative technologies to satellites that will limit our vulnerability.

China, Russia and other states in Asia are developing new fleets of fighter jets intended for use as close-air support for maneuver units. The last contested air campaign conducted by the U.S. was the Linebacker II offensive against North Vietnam in December 1972. Since then, we have faced the fearsome Grenadans, the horrible Haitians, the mighty Serbian military and the “elite” Republican Guard of Iraq — none of whom had anything resembling a credible air force. It would be a tragic mistake, however, to assume that condition will continue into infinity. So long as potential enemies of the U.S. possess the capacity to strike American ground troops with attack aviation, we must maintain air defense units at the tactical level.

Numerous senior Defense Department leaders have emphasized their intent to develop the capacity to build a force capable of rapid deployment anywhere in the world. If we want to be capable of executing that intent and pose a serious operational threat to future enemies, we must posses the necessary assets. To meet that requirement, we need a sufficient number of transport aircraft large and tough enough to do the job.

In an October memorandum to senior leaders of the U.S. Military Academy, retired Gen. Barry McCaffrey wrote: “We must create the strategic national military airlift and air-to-air refuel capability (600+ C-17 aircraft) to project national military and humanitarian power in the global environment. We currently have an inadequate capability with 150 aircraft supported by an aging refueling fleet. ... If we are to pose a serious deterrent capability in the dangerous world arena, then we must credibly be able to project power back into future combat areas to sustain allies at risk. The C-17 represents the capacity to carry out this strategic power projections mission.”

Complementing the aircraft, we also need to expand and modernize landing-strip-building “Red Horse” squadrons. A Red Horse squadron is an engineer unit designed to perform damage repair required for recovery of critical Air Force facilities and utility systems, and aircraft launch and recovery. In addition, Red Horse units accomplish engineer support for bed-down of weapon systems required to initiate and sustain operations in an austere, bare-base environment, including remote hostile locations. These formations should be strengthened and increased in number to provide the joint force with the capability to establish airfields where none previously existed. We need to give the force commander the ability to send in airborne or air assault troops to secure a piece of selected terrain suitable for the construction of an airfield, protect the approaches, then insert a Red Horse squadron, which would use state-of-the-art components to construct an airfield capable of handling C-17 transports within 12 hours of arrival. Once completed, an aerial beachhead would be established and expanded to serve as a rapidly emplaced aerial point for forced-entry operations.

Just as we need to bolster our ability to transport maneuver forces via C-17, we likewise need to modernize and increase our capacity to move heavy forces rapidly via fast sealift. To increase the deterrent our military poses to any nation considering military action against the U.S., we need to continue the development of capable, fast sea transport and invest in the development of sea basing for power projection of land forces. Although air transport can rapidly emplace forces, it would take an inordinate number of sorties to move heavy forces into an area when that was required. Sealift — fast sealift — would give the U.S. the ability to insert forces into an emergency immediately if needed, but then rapidly deploy forces heavy enough to engage anything the enemy could throw out, and sustain those forces over the long term. Associated with this capability is the concept of “sea basing.” The concept is still not mature, but the idea holds great potential. If the Navy can figure a way to safeguard a floating base so that it is not overly vulnerable to anti-shipping weapons, this capability could add significantly to America’s power projection capability.

OWNING THE SKIES

Historically speaking, nothing gives an army the chance to dominate on the ground like an air force that dominates the skies. It is said that the arm of decision is the ground force, but history has provided strong evidence that the nation that owns the skies owns the ground. Certainly, air power alone cannot win major wars, but without it, ground forces become extremely vulnerable. In the future, we may well succeed in producing the most powerful land force in the world. But for that force to win the nation’s wars at the lowest possible cost, it is imperative that we own the skies. Whether it’s the F-22, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter or some other airframe, the U.S. must invest to ensure the Air Force continues to dominate the skies.

Without question, as technology has advanced and proliferated over the past three or four decades, ballistic and guided missiles have become the weapon of choice for militaries across the world. Our defense against them must likewise increase.

China, Russia, India and Pakistan, of course, have highly advanced arsenals of tactical and theater missiles. But there are scores of other nations — such as Iran and North Korea — that have a growing and sophisticated capability in this area. If we do not invest in a robust capability to defend against this rapidly advancing threat, whatever force we put in the field will be increasingly vulnerable. It is critical that we build a robust and credible missile defense, both at the tactical and theater levels.

Force modernization is not all about platforms, software and high technology. A modernization program also must include a training development program. If we advance the way we fight by adding new capabilities, we must concurrently train our troops how best to apply them. As we develop new fighting doctrine and equip the force with the latest technology, we must never fail to understand that war is a brutish, bloody, chaotic and unpredictable affair. It is important, therefore, that as we design training plans to support new concepts it be done with the understanding that the essential principles of war are not negated by modernization.

Today, our Army is sharply focused on the counterinsurgency fight, which is appropriate. But the requirement to succeed in the present fight must not detract from the need to prepare for tougher fights in the future. Bluntly put, the counterinsurgency fight does not represent an existential threat to the U.S. It may cause problems, it may result in a loss of prestige, but the U.S. isn’t going to collapse, even if we overtly lost in Iraq; get preparation for the conventional fight wrong, however, and we run the risk of being unprepared for an enemy that has the ability to inflict catastrophic damage both to our armed forces and the American way of life. Getting transformation right and effective combat-focused training are absolute requirements to prevent that from happening.

We must tailor our future training programs to counter the capabilities inherent in the countries with the most potent military capabilities. We must, therefore, resist the temptation to conduct command-post exercises, simulations and field-training exercises that are so scripted and controlled that everything always works, communications are always up, and significant time is always given for preparation, rehearsals, etc. More problematic, however, is our tendency to portray an enemy force that is docile, unimaginative and poorly equipped.

I have participated in numerous division-level Warfighter exercises and corps command-post exercises, and countless numbers of simulation exercises at the battalion level and below. In virtually every one of these, the enemy force is equipped with significantly weaker forces than those of the friendly unit. Particularly at the division level, rehearsals and practice exercises are done months in advance of the Warfighter, and often as much as two weeks before the exercise, headquarters and signal troops will establish the division main command post to ensure that every phone line, every satellite communications device and every radio is up and running. I recall the commanding general exploding during one exercise because one of his telephones went down. I wondered what this officer would have done in combat when half his assets were down as a result of a combination of terrain masking, atmospheric conditions and enemy action.

While we spend enormous amounts of money developing and fielding awesome technology, we must not fall prey to the belief that such equipment always will provide us combat overmatch against all opponents. Presently, we depict exactly this in the vast majority of our training exercises and simulations. To give our future forces the best chance of success when we face a tough opponent, we must reverse this trend.

To summarize, the following nine changes and additions should be made to the Defense Department modernization program:

1. Improve the armored protection of our armored fighting platforms.

2. Increase the ability of reconnaissance forces to fight for information in a degraded mode.

3. Implement a counter-UAV and space-defense program.

4. Return air defense to the tactical formation in recognition of improving threat capabilities.

5. Expand our air transport fleet to enable rapid strategic and operational movement and maneuver.

6. Improve the ability of land forces to engage in operations worldwide via fast sealift and sea basing.

7. Field significant numbers of advanced fighter aircraft to ensure air superiority.

8. Strengthen missile defense.

9. Place an increased emphasis on training the force in light of emerging capabilities with a focus on the realities of ground combat.

If substantive changes are not made in the way the Defense Department transforms the Army, based on the correlation of forces and overall analysis of the preceding sections of this study, the U.S. faces the very real possibility that if it takes on a determined, well-equipped and well-trained foe, we could suffer our first major defeat since the Chinese hordes came pouring across the Yalu River in North Korea on Thanksgiving Day 1950.

Too often, we exaggerate what technology can do for us and underestimate what the enemy can do. Of our own volition, we have reduced the combat power of current organizations in the hope that technology will give us an advantage in the future; in the belief that our air- and space-based intelligence platforms will always give us critical information about the enemy, we have dissolved the most powerful reconnaissance formation in our nation’s history and replaced it with an organization that has no ground reconnaissance capability; we are replacing what has been proven in combat as the world’s best main battle tank with a lightly armored vehicle that cannot survive direct-fire engagements with enemy tanks and which depends on an uninterrupted flow of information for its survival; despite numerous, high-level Defense Department and governmental studies explicitly quantifying China’s military modernization and the specific threats it poses to future American forces, no changes to formations or fighting doctrine have occurred; and almost exclusively, we prepare our forces to face a docile, weak and unimaginative enemy in future combat, despite the potentially hostile forces in the world today with demonstrated capabilities well above those we depict.

Although we are heading in the wrong direction, the future has not yet been irreversibly determined.

There is still time to make course corrections. But if we hold on to current plans despite the presence of so much evidence that demands change, the future battlefield could become an American tragedy.

The time for action is now.