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To the Air Force, which could have avoided the first loss of a B-2 bomber if it had properly documented a procedure that was critical to the aircraft’s safe operation. An accident investigation into the February crash of a B-2 shortly after takeoff from Guam concluded it was caused by moisture in the aircraft’s sensors that distorted preflight readings. This, in turn, led the B-2’s control computer to force the aircraft to pitch up to such an extent that it stalled and crashed. The ground crew and pilots had followed procedures. But they were not aware of the criticality of moisture on the B-2’s sensors, nor of a technique for evaporating it. Although the issue had been known for two years, it was never recorded in maintenance manuals, and only some pilots and technicians were aware of it through word of mouth.

If an airline had committed such a failure of safety oversight, it likely would have been grounded and heavily fined. The Air Force needlessly lost a $1.4 billion bomber and put at risk the lives of two of its pilots, who ejected to safety.