For far too long, American military planners and civilian policymakers have imagined future military capabilities through rose-colored glasses. In the 1990s, the peace dividend was paramount and threats were allowed to fester under the illusion that they could not harm America. Later, the information technology boom fed another delusion — that the fog and friction of human conflict could be swept away. The resulting mania known as the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) produced an interesting but inconclusive debate. A spate of interesting theories about network-centric warfare (NCW), rapid dominant operations, shock and awe, and effects-based operations were put forth, many seeking to exploit a presumed technological advantage for American arms that could not be easily copied or negated. Paradoxically, the U.S. military was urged to adopt Toffleresque notions of war with great urgency before someone else did.

http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/12/2360042