At a seminar on the subject of NATO and its further evolution, the basic premise was that the global situation had changed significantly and NATO must adjust if we are to succeed collectively in an era of instability. A number of high-ranking general officers in key NATO posts and respected academics and thinkers on military affairs were in attendance. One therefore would have reasonable grounds to consider this a useful gathering of the "wise men" to ponder the outlines of how we might adjust our approach. The discussion proceeded apace until I threw out a basic question: "Why would we even consider fighting an asymmetric situation with conventional forces?"

http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/01/2362906

I am a Seattle and Jerusalem-based think tank director organizing the 'sets of all Unconventional military thinkers' and would welcome contacts -

Slim

Col Bullock says much in a short space.

Why was his question "... met by silence."?

Possibly because his question falls into the same category as asking "Which is the best SAM to equip your forces with if your enemy doesn't have any aircraft?" and there is no logical reason for fighting asymetrical situations with "conventional forces". ("Conventional forces" being used here to mean "forces suitable for fighting an 'Industrial War'".)

Engaging the "ghosts in the night" can only be done (reliably and successfully) by using forces that are equally "ghostly". On the other hand, "conventional forces", if properly equipped and trained are an essential element of the mix - if only to consolidate the gains that your "friendly ghosts" have made.

As for "... because the message is that foreigners MUST do for them what they themselves cannot.", that is moot. The "locals" are already well aware of what they are unable to do for themselves. IF "our guys" are seen as being imposed on the "locals" then, yes, the "locals" will get upset. HOWEVER if "our guys" are seen as coming in in response to a request to a friend for assistance then that response in much muted. Even more, if "our guys" are seen as coming in to help the "locals" gain the skills and equipment that they require in order to help themselves deal with "the other side" the way that they want to, the adverse responses are almost minimal because by doing that "our guys" are seen as helping the local authorities exert THEIR authority. Thus "we" become a part of the "us".

Unfortunately a successful implementation of this type of action is much harder because it requires troops of a level hard to recruit. But, "much harder" is not the same as "impossible. What is required is a rethinking of the personnel requirements at almost a basic level. (Given that seniour staff have made their careers out of supporting the existing system, the odds on that happening are slim.)

Regardless of whether "new model" or "conventional" troops are used, it will still require "...significant numbers of troops and a lengthy duration if they are ever to be effective." simply because "the other side" has invested much of their "macho" and "self-definition" on being inevitably right.

Col Bullock also makes reference to "- the classic political arguments of "guns vs butter". However this is an argument that only applies if one ignores all but the short term costs. At its simplest, is it "cheaper" to (for the sake of simplicity over a 1,000 day period) spend $100 a day for 1,000 days or to spend $1,000 a day for 10 days and $0 a day for 990 days? If you only look at the first 10 days, then $100 is "cheaper" but if you look at the whole 100 days the $1,000 is.

In any event, Col Bullock's "We would sieze back the the initiative." is the crux of the equation. Fighting the war that the other side wants you to fight, where the other side wants you to fight it, and when the other side wants you to is an almost 100% guaranteed formula for failure. The trick is to make the other side fight the war that you want them to fight, where and when you want them to do it. The current situation in the Middle East is an almost classic case of allowing "the other guys" to dictate the pace of engagement.

Col Bullock's "A cautionary note" raises another question -but probably for later discussion - and that is "If you cannot afford to have BOTH an effective "conventional force" AND an effective "new model force" do you chose to have:

[a] the one with all the bells, whistles, and 'sexy' equipment (and loads of Generals);

[b] the one that you are most likely to have to use (and a command structure based on actual need);

or

[c] a "combination" that does neither well (which generally also involves having loads of Generals as well)?

From the CF perspective (dealing only with actually possible threats and reasonably forseeable employments) there is only one country in the world that has the military and logistical capacity to attack (with a view to conquest) Canada. Since that country hasn't made any serious effort to do so for the past 195 years then the odds on Canada requiring a military that is geared towards "Industrial War" (which is what would be required to defeat that country) are pretty slim. [I am deliberately not dealing with "protection from a massive attack aimed at destruction and not conquest because that IS a totally different topic. {Equally I am not dealing with a threatened massive attack aimed at destruction because that is best dealt with by the old "Publish and be damned." response to blackmail.}] However, the CF is likely to become engaged in military activities on a lesser scale and against opposing forces using technology considerably less sophisticated (read as "complicated") than Abrams tanks, nuclear powered aircraft carriers/submarines, and Mach 3+ aircraft.

Thus the basic framework for the CF is almost self-evident (especially since high-quality, well treated, well trained, and well motivated troops are capable of learning more than one method of operations) and maybe it's time for a total re-think of structure/role for the CF.

(This is not the case for the United States of America which could split its military and have the best of both worlds. Given the history of US Special Forces, such an adjustment isn't out of the question - but it does raise serious "career path" and "institutional balliwick" issues.)

For those who want to cavail that "Canada is shirking its responsibility for national security by relying on the United States of America defend it." if it adopted the course of providing an effective and affordable "new model force", the rebuttal is simply to ask "Exactly how much has the United States of America spend over the last 195 years to defend Canada against the only country that could realistically attack it with a view to conquest?".

Hell, I'll even write a personal cheque to reimburse the US government for the full amount.