A new congressional committee is welcoming ideas for restructuring the agencies that are in charge of our national security. The Panel on Roles and Missions is a bipartisan group of seven House Armed Services Committee (HASC) members who spent six months examining the jurisdictional boundaries between the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps. More importantly, the panel also is vetting ideas for reforming the full spectrum of U.S. hard and soft power. <a href="http://militarytimes.com/static/projects/pages/hasc_roles_missions0308.pdf">Read the panel’s initial report (PDF)</a>.

http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2008/03/3410040

How about trying something like:

"OK guys, here's the deal. There is a total of $Xxx,xxx,xxx,xxx in the pot. Everyone gets $Xxx,xxx,xxx,xxx/2N (where N is the number of agencies) for starters. The remaining $Xxx,xxx,xxx,xxx/2N gets distributed at the end of the fiscal year based on the number (and percentage) of CORRECT findings the agencies produce. Oh yes, and it is also mandatory that every piece of information that any agency produces be shared with all other agencies within 72 hours - along with the producing agency's assessment of the source's reliability (backed by something that looks like it might actually be an intelligent reason). Oh, and one more thing 10% of that $Xxx,xxx,xxx,xxx is to be paid, tax-free, to the people who actually produce the CORRECT intelligence finding."

Clearly, there is a disconnect between strategic planning and defense budget programming. I have seen this first-hand in my previous Pentagon assignment and am currently writing a research paper on this topic at National Defense University. I propose leveraging a transformed QDR framework to provide a fiscally-constrained military strategy to a joint programming organization. Obviously, the military services Title 10 responsibilities of "organize, train, & equip" would have to be modified to accomplish (not easy), but would accomplish the desired effect of achieving joint capabilities instead of the roles and mission conundrum that we see today. Additionally, QDR planning should include military, political, academic (economic), and industry experts to build a collaborative, pragmatic military strategy that accounts for the U.S. budget and economic conditions and its impact on the overall DoD defense budget.

I take it that that means:


Am I correct?

Absolutely!

Well then, since you said "Additionally, QDR planning should include military, political, academic (economic), and industry experts to build a collaborative, pragmatic military strategy that accounts for the U.S. budget and economic conditions and its impact on the overall DoD defense budget." when you meant "An inclusive strategy that works and which we can afford.", you are obviously destined for higher staff officer positions (or even a good career at the upper management levels of the Civil Service).

The Army National Guard (ARNG) should focus on homeland security missions: 1) aiding border security, 2) Domestic Terrorism/WMD response, and 3) Natural disaster response. The Active-duty (AD) forces should retain the bulk of combat power and train for the conventional fight. In times of an overseas war both should be utilized. Initial combat, which is likely to be more conventional should include a larger AD force. As the situation on the ground begins to transfer from conventional combat to security and stability ops; the force ratio should rely more on the (ARNG). It will always be difficult to mark definitively when one phase ends and another begins and in reality the Guard will have to maintain it's conventional combat readiness, while the AD will also have to retain some nation-building capabilities. But, as a general statement about who should do what, I think this blend makes the most sense. I base this on my experience in Iraq; where I was in a ARNG Brigade that had an AD Battalion attached to it. I have dealt with both and I really believe that the ARNG is more capable of nation-building than the AD. Members of the ARNG are typically average citizens most of the time back home anyway. In my Battalion alone we had 3 teachers, 2 Principles, roughly 20+ police officers including several members of SWAT, and several fire fighters. My point is that ARNG soldiers typically bring with them not only their military skills, but often complimentary civilian skills that make them more capable of nation-buiding.

Not a bad analysis since it gets the job done using the available resources in the most effective manner.

However, I suspect that it will never fly because it won't allow very many ARNG officers to "get their tickets punched" for promotion beyond LtCol.

That's gonna sting a little! Of course, I tend to agree with your assessment of the reason some reserve and guard members volunteer to deploy. As an IMA (see my user name), I have trouble with the perception that somebody whose entire category of reserve duty is intended to provide support when the active duty guys (that's a generic term, in case that Lt Col who hates "Airman" is reading) deploy should be looked down upon for not deploying. Am I missing something? The last JAG promotion board I sat on, one of the big discriminators was whether the member had deployed, regardless of whether they were unit or IMA reservists.

And, whether one has deployed or not is going to give one a better understanding of "The Principle in Rylands v. Fletcher"??

(Reference to obscure legal point apologized for - but the reference in the post WAS to the JAG.)

[Aside:- Consider "The Principle in Rylands v. Fletcher" and how it applies to Iraq.]