Carrier culture shock

[Administrator]

As the Obama administration formulates its approach to national security policy, it would do well to start with reading “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” the Navy’s new maritime strategy. The document is at once a bold argument for a new direction in foreign and national security policy, an inadequate plan for a U.S. maritime grand strategy, and a symptom (and perhaps call for help) of the Navy’s current operational crisis. Each of these points will present themselves as the new administration develops its national security program.

http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2009/06/4034155

[CNWSDean]

David Wise levels what has been a fairly common criticism of the Navy's new Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (hereafter refered to as CS21). Principally, this criticism has emanated from inside the Beltway, where military strategy seems to be substantially equated with programs. There is good reason for this outlook, especially since the 1980s Maritime Strategy was developed (if you believe some the officers who wrote it) as a justification for the 600 ship Navy. However, the development of CS21 took a very different route and produced a very different articulation of stategy.

As Dean of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the U.S. Naval War College, I found myself in charge of the research and gaming effort that would underpin CS21. At the time that Admiral Mullen called for a new strategy (June 06) there was a controversy of sorts in the Navy over whether the fleet ought to consist solely of general purpose combat ships (CVN, CG, DDG, SSN, gators), or whether it should have specialized vessels for maritime security work, homeland defense, etc. I don't know if Mullen's call for the new strategy was motivated in part by a desire to resolve this controversy (the two camps led by senior flags) or not, but it was my view that the only way to do so was to develop overarching strategic precepts from which fleet structure could be deduced. Vice Admiral John Morgan, then the N3N5, gave us complete latitude to follow the logic of our strategic analysis where it led, regardless of the fleet size or shape it implied. For a more details on the project, see my article on it in the Spring 08 Naval War College Review ( http://www.usnwc.edu/press/review/Pr...wPDF.aspx?q=33 ).

It was my opinion that a) any consideration of fleet size or structure during the analysis would contaminate and distort it and b) inclusion of any such conclusions in the strategy would guarantee it would not survive staffing. The fact that CS21 was signed the three sea service chiefs and survived the transition of CNOs and administrations is, I believe, due in no small part to the lack of specifics on fleet size and ship types.

It should be noted that CS21 was conceived as much as a strategic communication with the rest of the world as it was a plan for sea service operations. In this regard it has been more successful than we could have hoped. It is my view that the naval cooperation we are seeing in the Gulf of Aden, where, for example, PLAN, JMSDF and ROKN ships are operating together, might not have occured without CS21 articulating a strategically defensive posture, making it politically easier for the navies of many nations to cooperate with us.

We always thought that the Navy would take CS21 and derive force structure from its logic. This is indeed what is happening, but it is taking time. We have been doing a number of analyses here at Newport that point to a different looking navy. Some of the conclusions can be seen in another article I wrote for the Review this past Spring at http://www.usnwc.edu/press/review/Pr...PDF.aspx?q=364 .

One thing seems clear at this point: the Navy needs more than 280 ships to execute CS21. Rear Admiral Buzz Buzby, Fleet Forces N3 has a great brief that shows how the Navy is executing the strategy, going to new places and doing new things. However at the end he says the Navy is down to a 1:1 dwell, which means that for every six months a sailor is deployed, he or she only gets six months at home. This is unsustainable and constitutes evidence that the Navy ought to be at least a third larger than it is today. We won't get those numbers by building 4 billion dollar ships; we must think about doing the widespread maritime security and engagement mission with cheap vessels. We would concentrate our warfighting capabilities in the two areas of the world where credible combat power is needed. Getting the Navy's culture as well as the Congressional interests reconciled with such a fleet structure takes time, so throwing out numbers as Wise suggests would be counter productive.