A failure in generalship

[Administrator]

<b>"You officers amuse yourselves with God knows what buffooneries and never dream in the least of serious service. This is a source of stupidity which would become most dangerous in case of a serious conflict."</b><br>
<i>- Frederick the Great</i>

http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/05/2635198

[CRM114]

After having served in the USMC during Desert Storm, and witnessing reviews through fitness reports first hand, it comes as no surprise to me that this war in Iraq is suffering as a result of mediocre leadership.

Today's generals were yesterday's company grade officers. Yesterday's company grade officers, from my experience, were promoted as a result of conformity: playing the game, as some call it now. Lukewarm leadership is the consequence.

Peer reviews, subordinate reviews along with superior reviews should all play a factor. Nothing will change unless the system is modified to stop rewarding officers whose shining triumph is that they managed to walk the line without stepping on a crack in the sidewalk.

I know there are a great many good officers out there; unfortunately, with the way the current system works, I'm afraid very few, if any, will have the opportunity to be part of the solution for the future.

It took a lot of balls for Lt. Col. Yingling to write his opinion piece. I'd like to see an equal amount of testicular fortitude on the part of the generals to whom he is referring, though I won't hold my breath waiting for the system to change.

For clarification, I was not an officer during my time in the USMC; rather, a non-commissioned officer (Corporal).

[sullivan013]

I must admit my failure as an amatuer historian. I can find it no where recorded that John J. Pershing, George Catlett Marshall, Dwight Eisenhouer, George Patton, or Douglas MacArthur ever spoke another language with fluency or earned an advanced degree in Anthropology.

How they ever were promoted past Lieutenant is a mystery.<g>

Perhaps the author has watched Gilbert and Sullivan's "Pirates of Penzance" once too often.

"I am the very model of a modern Major-General,
I’ve information vegetable, animal, and mineral,
I know the kings of England , and I quote the fights historical
From Marathon to Waterloo , in order categorical;
I’m very well acquainted, too, with matters mathematical,
I understand equations, both the simple and quadratical,
About binomial theorem I’m teeming with a lot o’ news –
With many cheerful facts about the square of the hypotenuse."

I'll be the first to admit that the Army was ill prepared for the current counter-insurgency campaign in Iraq . However, before laying blame on our conventional-minded military leadership in the 1990s, I challenge the author to find another Army in history that was ever fully prepared for a counter insurgency campaign after securing the defeat of a presiding government.

I also challenge the author to illustrate how conjegating the verb 'to be' in German could possibly help in our current situation in Iraq.

Ich - bin
du - bist
er, sie, es - ist
wir - sind
ihr - seit
Sie,sie - seit


Puh-leeze. The author is well off base on this one. These men are the product of one of the best organizational meritocracies in the world, and have proven records in military leadership, war fighting, and professional competence. Applying blanket philosophical statements on the nature of war and warfare to a specific challenging situation like Iraq is a fool's errand



Sullivan013

[barry taylor]

Today and the Future

The prospect of having Generals in a position to fight tomorrow’s wars, in the best way possible, may hinge on several things. Some of these may not be in control of the Generals.

The Congress of the U.S declaring a victory for the enemy is not helpful, and can indeed cause the total loss of Iraq citizens to a grim fate.

The lack of will, ability, and knowledge of history of many U.S. Citizens to focus beyond short attention spans may say that any war has to be fought quickly and only when the enemy is actually on U.S. soil causing massive damage. This is hardly in control of the Generals.

The concept of fighting your army for training purposes was used by Hitler and the USSR in Spain before WW2. The Spanish Civil War was very useful for both of these Nations.

Fighting the Army in Iraq1 and Afghanistan may have worked well for the U.S. Iraq 2 seems to be more problematic. Do we gain by these lessons or throw them away so that we can not use them in the future?

There may be several choices regarding Iraq.

Let the Democrats lay out how they will negotiate the surrender of Iraq to the enemy and let the Democrats lay out and take responsibility for the U.S surrender of the People of Iraq. In the Democrat surrender, the aftermath in the Middle East and the world including Indonesia and South America as well as Eastern Europe must be projected.

OR, Leave the Military to decide as to how it will continue or end this difficult warfare. Micro-management by LBJ and the implementation of Nixon’s secret plan caused grief to the military and outrage by the U.S. left, during Nam. The U.S public is not well equipped by education of history to do well in this area. To make matters worse the Political situation is in a struggle for control of the U.S. and it appears that a win in Iraq would be bad for one of the political parties.

Due to the World Wide impact that this situation in Iraq will have on the enemy radicals and in the background, the likes of Communist Chavez, and Putin are rattling the sabers also, causing some potential problems in South American and with Russia. Now agreed

It may be that some serious mistakes have been made in Iraq. It also may be that some mistakes have been blown out of proportion by the media and that the upside has not been reported as it should have been to the American Citizens.

However, If Iraq is sacrificed for an American political election purposes, as it appears some are attempting—

Then, the Military of our future must be a part of political dictates. We are simi/non functional in our present state.

The time has come in our National history for the Military to become a part of the governing process equal to the Congress, President, and the Court.

Another branch of government is now needed and that is the Military.

I am not in nor have I been in the military. I AM a very concerned citizen watching the direction our Nation.

[Retired AF]

While I agree that our current general officer corps is a sorry lot, I think the fault ultimately lies with congress. Today’s Generals/Admirals are politicians looking to see whose a.. to kiss to get another star or to stay or move up in power. An officer does not rise to power by great leadership but by great politicking. Meanwhile congress is owned by the military-industrial complex that General Eisenhower warned us about and so the Generals/Admirals ask for faster airplanes and bigger warships to use against an enemy that does not exist while cutting back on troops and the things they need (such as better hand weapons and body armor) to pay for them. The ultimate beneficiaries are the congressmen who receive the largess from the companies who make the un-needed weapons.

Ten plus years ago the US Air Force had a GREAT general, but when he found that even as AF Chief of Staff, everything was political and beyond his power to influence, her retired early – to be replaced by another a.. kissing political officer.

To understand why officers do the things they do one has only to understand “The Greatest Management Principle in the World” as identified in a book of that title by Michael LeBeouf. “What gets rewarded gets done” explains it all.

[Wordy Bird]

With some restrictions on blatantly personal attacks of no merit, this might become a helpful component of the selection process.

The notion that Congress would be of some great value seems rather far fetched, unfortunately. Note that the Guard & Reserves are political footballs at the state level, with those inherent problems in training and integration and priorities.

Cutting through the excess then, we 1) needed about another 150,000 troops on the ground to start and stay in Iraq and 2) should have shot the looters on sight to set the proper tone.

Political correctness is likely more of a negative factor in results to date, than any great intellectual or training deficiencies. Contrary to popular belief, there are few dolts in the flag officer group - though some are certainly more creative and inspiring than others. Discussing the interpersonal relations and style differences between say a Patton versus a Grant would take up half the bandwidth on the Internet.

It is all a very expensive learning process to be sure, but the folks at the NTC do in fact have their eyes on the ball, know the street-level needs in Iraq and elsewhere, and are as concerned with the slowness in new technology integration as any group on the globe.

Note: We need a national federal foreign languages Academy ala West Point, that would supply ready staffers and field ops for the services and intel agencies. You can have some crossover in applications, but our lack of Arabic and Chinese speakers needs to be addressed as a national security priority in every respect including formal schooling funded at the DOD level, and for the long term.

[marcus_petreius]

LTCOL Yingling's analysis of the failures of our flag officer corps is in accord with my own observations in the six years I have been in the military. While I do not agree with his current assessment of Iraq(considering it is an ongoing operation) and many of his proposed solutions, I will focus my comments specifically on the problem of American generalship.
Although it is common for young officers such as myself to regard the highest ranks with some disdain and righteous indignation, current events largely vindicate such opinions. There is no question in my mind that the current system of promotion, retention, and retirement of general officers is in dire need of repair. However, I do not see a way to allow for innovative and free-speaking commanders when considering the immense power the media employs against all public servants who are outside of what the media considers "mainstream." Therefore, unless the prospective general's opinions contrast with an administration the media considers with hostility (the current administration for one), the media will ridicule and deride those opinions as radical and the officer will be compelled to apologize or step down. Thus, our society and situation differ greatly from that of the Prussians who were unified under a absolutist monarch.
Our media is now in the process of politicizing the officer corps, beginning with the top ranks, by wielding its power to influence public opinion. It does this in a manner unseen in history because the technology of mass media is new to the world. The individual American citizen, constantly bombarded with a barrage of negative coverage will eventually yield to the prevailing opinion- how much less will the individual American politician be able to hold out? Until the media war is won, the fight to reform the general officer corps will be doomed and you can expect more of the same conformity.

[Jim Roberts]

Several organizational failures: 1) Rumsfeld absolutely refused to plan for the post-invasion necessities in Iraq. 2) No one (including the President) asked the vital questions: How does the invasion improve our position in the region, and where do we want to end up vis a vis Iran? Although Saddam was an evil tyrant, he was an important counterweight to Iran. 3) Many senior generals "rolled over" when Rumsfeld bullied them, and gave up their important roles as the senior military advisors to the civilian government. 4) The coincidence of Cheney and Rumsfeld micromanaging the war clouded the advice given to the President. In many respects, the current war is a modern Republican version of "The Best and the Brightest". 5) The military meritocracy does not reward creativity (although GEN Patreaus seems to be an exception to the rule).

The earlier comment about "ten years ago, Air Force generals were great generals" but not anymore, probably could be said about all brances of service particularly because the Rumsfeld era started in 2001. I had much more confidence in the senior leaders in Desert Storm (e.g., Schwartzkoff, Horner, etc.) than now, with the exception of GEN Patreaus who has been given a nearly impossible task by a President whose advisors have led us nearly to disaster and a Congress which is posturing for the respective political parties as the 2008 elections approach. I sincerely hope that Patreaus can figure out how to tame the beast, because much more is at stake than simply pacifying Iraq.

[Wordy Bird]

Originally Posted by marcus_petreius

Our media is now in the process of politicizing the officer corps beginning with the top ranks by wielding its power to influence public opinion. It does this in a manner unseen in history because the technology of mass media is new to the world. The individual American citizen, constantly bombarded with a barrage of negative coverage will eventually yield to the prevailing opinion- how much less will the individual American politician be able to hold out? Until the media war is won, the fight to reform the general officer corps will be doomed and you can expect more of the same conformity.

The domesticated Clinton political doctrine is much the same (co-enablers, to be sure): Pit the Guard & Reserve families against the situations of the regulars, i.e. divide and conquer our combined military at home, with no thought of what that does to our fighting effectiveness abroad.

One part of the answer then is obvious, and that is to increase our regular armed forces (at least 3 Army divisions, 2 for Marines to start), and to slowly but surely reduce the numbers of "weekend warriors" that simply don't get (and won't get) the same quality of SUSTAINED training, that conflicts of the future will require. The days of the mandatory local militia are over, but the gubners roundly fail to see the greater good instead of their local power claims - and in both major parties, sadly.

Instead of an emphasis on radical changes in officer training then, we need some radical changes in the number of heavy divisions, and how they are equipped - with commensurate reductions and eventual fading out of the part-time units.

That is another long known but rarely spoken truth, adversely impacted by political correctness and local & state stupidity.

I'll go out even further on the limb, and note that the highest percentage of behavioral problems (Abu Ghraib) in the combat zones are among Guard and Reserve members - and that's part of the same problem, which can only be addressed in the long run by a change in our force structure.

[Jaxhawk]

Col. it sounds like you have been passed over by people you feel are inferior to You. This is probably true. The feminization of the military along with the "PC" and affirmative action you leaders have to deal with would be more than I could put up with. Maybe it is time to retire and find a real life? Thank you for your service, but your message is too little and too late.The American public has bought into Murtahs position. God help us! GWW