Shootdown solution

[Administrator]

Helicopter pilots flying in the lethal environment of Iraq are faced with a dilemma — one that may prevent them from seeing the world as it is and instead lead them to see it as they've been told it would be.

http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/06/2649720

[USMAjoe]

I am not an avionics expert, nor a helicopter expert, but I have been involved with all elements of the Army's operational and tactical fire and maneuver scheme. (Tanks, Planes, Helicopters, Trucks, and Feet). Helicopters serve many useful roles on the battlefield, but are optimally suited for low level altitude tasks. Tasks and missions above 3,000 feet are better suited for fixed wing or VTOL aircraft that combine higher aeronautical speeds with higher weapons payload capacity and range. Helicopters provide a unique niche in the altitudes below 3,000 feet where the ability to loiter, hover, maneuver, and land in tight areas is important. To adjust tactics on a case by case basis to adjust to situations on the ground in Iraq is both understandable and needed in the interim, but to attempt to change the inherent nature of helicopter warfare for the long term seems folly. We don't need to build a better helicopter, we need to fix the problems that have created the increased use of helicopters in Iraq; primarily tactical airlift, CAS, and C4ISR between ground and airborne weapon systems and personnel. The military is addressing these problems with their current transformation initiatives and I have seen the amazing effects that increased CAS and C4ISR effectiveness through UAV's, Sniper PODs, and JDAMS have brought to our fight in the war on terror. The additional emphasis on Tactical Airlift with the procurement of aircraft that can use smaller runways (SHERPA etc.) seems to fill the other half of our tactical airlift dilemma and will dramatically reduce the volume of rotary wing flights in country. These advancements that bring the volume of helicopter flights down and allow it to fill its more doctrinal missions below 3,000 feet, but limit their ***ulative exposure, are the only suitable means to address the current helicopter losses without asking them to conduct a mission they will never perform as well as their fixed wing counterparts. We have all seen the negative impact of using HMMWV's in High Intensity Conflict environments. We have seen that the addition of armor, technology, and tactics can only go so far until the original purpose of the platform is lost and it is neither a capable light vehicle transport nor a capable combat platform. Asking helicopters to fly at 10,000 feet is the same as asking a HMMWV to gain thousands of pounds of armor, and will ultimately result in same conclusion.

[RC21]

With thousands of hours in tactical helicopters and time in both active AORs I'd love to dive in and disagree with a number of the COL's points. However this discussion is, at least in my opinion, best left out of an open venue such as this. RC21

[robert Shule]

Indeed as mentioned it would not be good to discuss military technical details in an open forum; that is how people do get hurt. However, what is too often overlooked is the political issue. Why is somebody trying to shoot down our helocopter in the first place? How did we make a people our enemy? Afterall, that is the underlying problem in the first place. Now, how can this issue be resolved? More armor, a better weapon, or a new military tactic will never solve that problem. Too often we only think to resort to force, but clearly we see that especially in Iraq that course of action is not working. There should be more to good soldiering than blindly following an order. Maybe some pressure on the Commander in Chief along with all those other civilian politicians and pundits to revise their greater strategy that puts our good troops out to be attacked by some very many very upset people is what is really needed.

[Major Riptide]

I've flown and hour or two in Iraq, and am in the midst of authoring a paper on this very subject. I think there are some key points to be made here, so I offer the following smattering of thoughts (not necessarily in order or related);

- The nature of the helicopter is not as important as the nature of the enemy.

- Tactics must be evolutionary, not static. What's good today won't be good tomorrow. We are, many times, wedded to doctrinal or "school house" solutions, many of which were born of the Cold War in anticipation of flying against a sophisticted, integrated air defense network - clearly not the case in Iraq. Each evolution in air defense operations by the insurgents is born of trial and error until they find a predictable weakness they can exploit. Sadly, we wait until we have been exploited to take action.

- The best tactic is to change tactics.

- Would you be suprised to learn that in the last 3 years the highest concentrations of lethal enemy engagements of Coalition Helicopters has been during times when the FEWEST surface to air fire events were observed / recorded? Immediately following the last lethal event, total lethal events went down to an average of less than 1 for the next 6 months, while observed and reported surface to air fire events went up by almost 50%. What does this tell us?

- We've never lost a helicopter to enemy fire at night.

- "I don't care what it was DESIGNED to do...I care what it CAN do." Ed Harris as Mission Controller Gene Kranz in Apollo 13. B-52 bombers providing close air support and F-117 Stealth "Fighters" conducting strategic, deep strikes during Operation Desert Storm. Would Billy Mitchell be proud or appalled?

- 10 times as many people die from being struck by lightning than die from shark attacks every year, yet many people won't get in the water. More people die every year in traffic accidents that in the entire Vietnam War, yet many people fear flying. We've lost more lives to helicopter accidents than to enemy fire. What role does our visceral fear of being murdered play into our selection of tactics? What about our illusions of our individual sphere of control? What is REALLY the most likely thing to kill us on any given day under a given set of conditions (weather, geography, threat, etc...)

- WHAT MAKES A PILOT TURN OF HIS IR POSITION LIGHTS IN THE BUSIEST AIRSPACE IN IRAQ, NEARLY COLLIDING WITH SEVERAL OTHER AIRCRAFT, ALL DUE TO A REPORT THAT THE INSURGENTS HAVE NVGS?

-RIPTIDE