Flying lessons

[Administrator]

As an Army aviator and avid reader of AFJ, I was excited to see your cover story dedicated to the employment of emerging tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) used to counter the threat to Army aviation assets in Operation Iraqi Freedom ["Flying high," June]. I was, however, disappointed to see that the author, an Air Force helicopter pilot, missed the mark on both the threat present in Iraq and the driving force why Army helicopters remain at nap of the earth (NOE) altitudes.

http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/08/2939040

[cullinan]

I absolutely agree with MAJ vonEschenback's assesment of Col. Jim Slife's article "Flying High," June 2007. He couldn't have rebutted Col. Slife's article any better.

[Thinker]

Every time one of these things go down it makes the national news. They are a strategic liability. With so many eggs in one very fragile basket, the political cost of a large transport going down is devestating to our efforts. Their use as transports should be kept to a minimum.

[Major Riptide]

You have some valid points, and while I am not defending COL Silfe wholesale, he also has some valid points. However, I am compelled to disagree with you on a couple of key topics.

By way of reference, I am currently in Iraq, where I have flown an hour or two in the last year or so.

- "The author also states that it would be possible to fly close-air support from 3,000 feet. If that TTP is applied, the threat could be mitigated, but the employment of machine guns and 2.75-inch rockets at those altitudes against small teams of insurgents in an urban in environment is extremely challenging and carries the increased the risk of collateral damage and fratricide. Risk because of weather and employment of night-vision goggles would also be increased at those altitudes."

First, if you are firing rockets in urban terrain, from any altitude, you brought the wrong tools for the job. Rockets are not accurate, and are largely ineffective.

Second, you can conduct CCAs against small teams of insurgents at altitudes that provide an acceptable combination of lateral and vertical stand-off IF you take advantage of your optics and precision hellfire shots. The 30mm gun on the AH-64, though not designed to kill infantry, is moderately effective and acceptably accurate.

Urban combat is messy no matter how you slice it - and it always will be.

When it comes to OH-58D TTPs, you simply have a really tough problem with an inadequate aircraft. Despite many claims to the contrary, the OH-58D sucks in urban terrain. In reality, it sucks in almost any attack/CCA role. This shouldn't suprise us because it was designed to SEE things (which it does well), not KILL things. This is why the Army wants to get rid of it.

"Missed by the author is the fact that the Army has done significant work to improve its TTPs to counter the threat in both Iraq and Afghanistan to ensure its dominance as the premier helicopter force in the world. Early in 2004, at the direction of the Army's vice chief of staff, Gen. Richard Cody, then the Army G-3, the Army Aviation Warfighting Center at Fort Rucker, Ala., stood up an Aviation Shoot Down Assessment Team with the mission of studying forensic evidence and after-action review of each shootdown to quickly recommend to the field commanders how to best counter the ever changing threats.

From these first steps, Army aviation made quantum leaps in doctrine, equipment and training to better its mission support and counter the threat. The Common Missile Warning System , the creation of combat maneuvering flight tasks in the Aircrew Training Manuals and the refinement of the employment of both Kiowa Warriors and Apaches in the close combat attack role are just a few of the examples of how far we have come since the early and hard lessons of Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan."

That briefs well, but in reality we Army Aviators have a ways to go.

ASDAT is a great thing, but I have personally listened to them come into Iraq and advise us to do things which were, honestly, stupid. We disregarded their advice and stuck with tactics that we had developed ourselves, and we have been highly successful in both accomplishing the mission, killing the enemy, preventing accidents, and denying the ability or the opportunity to engage us.

ASDAT does a great job on the investigation side, but they are lousy at translating that into implementable tactics for units in the field. I take everything they say in that regard with a grain of salt - as well everyone should.

By the way, the few people and aircraft we have lost to enemy fire have been OH-58Ds doing exactly what you advocate in your article - trying to engage with their machine guns and rockets in complex terrain when they were out matched, outgunned and would have been better served to stand off and engage with missiles, or call for help. Unfortunately, we seem to have convinced some OH-58D pilots that their aircraft is an attack aircraft, which it's not. It can effectively kill the enemy, but we must remain aware of it's limitations.

The assertion that we have made "quantum leaps" regarding TTPs is questionable. CMWS is a great technology, but it's not a TTP. The fact that you mention CMWS contradicts your entire arguement. CMWS counters MANPADs which are the primary threat at higher altitudes. So, if heavy machine guns and small arms remain a threat at lower altitudes, but we can counter MANPADs at higher altitudes, what does that tell you we ought to do?

If you look at Army Helicopter shoot downs over the past two years, you will find that almost without exception they were flying at altitudes that correspond to outdated, cold war TTPs.

Am I saying that high altitudes are the end all answer? No, but then again, neither did Col Silfe. What I am saying is that high altitudes are part of the equation, and dismissing them, or any other TTPs out of hand, is both inadvisable and dangerous.

We have used high altitudes in Iraq in some situations (threat-dependant) with great success - much to the consternation of some "old heads" who simply could not get past the idea that NOE is the only way to protect yourself from enemy fire.

If you are a Commander in the field, the absolute best thing you can do is sit down at night and get inside your enemy's head. Think about how he can kill you. Then think about all the ways that the ground, wires, obstacles, weather, and maintenance can kill you. Finally, go out the next day and do something about it. Do it all again the next day because a lot will have changed since yesterday.

If you do this, it will lead you to conclusions that may be non-doctrinal and/or untested. Sometimes your solution may square up with the book - sometimes it won't. War is risky, not matter what. But you will be better served in the long run with a well thought out tactic that you have designed to solve YOUR tactical problem, than you will with a one-size-fits-all schoolhouse solution.

You have to be constantly observing and evolving to be a step ahead of the enemy, and you can't dismiss any potential advantageous TTP out of hand.

This is how my unit has operated while we have been here. We have not always done the things that ASDAT recommended. We have not always followed doctrine. What we have done is balance accidental and tactical risk on a mission-by-mission basis while remaining open minded to any potential TTP which could give us even the slightest advantage. The result has been that we have enjoyed an unprecedented record of success, both in safety and mission accomplishment.

[CW5helodrvr]

The issue with any of these discussions is the recurring attempt to come up with one answer. Experience has shown that not only is helicopter TTP selection important for the mission, it is important for each mission segment. Very few helicopter drivers in IZ or AF, Army or Marine, seem to get that. The bottom line is you're at risk no matter what TTP you select. You're in some weapon engagement zone from takeoff to landing. It is impossible to predict, outside of a Troops in Contact event, if you'll be the guy shot at or the guy ignored. Any TTP recommendations, from the unit you just RIP'd, the ASDAT, or your Commander, has to be taken with a grain of salt. If you're the one driving you better think about it long and hard, and not trust someone else no matter what they wear on their shirt front or have studied.
The ASDAT guys aren't that bad, they work a problem no one else will and at least look at the data. I'm not one for TTP by number crunching, I want insight not stat's, but at least they're wrestling with the data. The Intell' Community isn't. The ASDAT goes out of their way to state they are just observers of the fight, not in it full time, it's up to the unit to fight their fight, and select their TTP on a mission by mission basis.
By definition, fighting an insurgency means the bad guys are unpredictable and they want to win the I/O war, not necessarily the war out on the battlefield. Successful TTPs result in mission success with the least casualties, not necessarily the least battle damage. Before you insert a solution from another war, hot or cold, remember the enemy is different, the aircraft are different, and the weapon capabilities (on both sides) are different. The solution has to be different too.