New answers to hard questions

[Administrator]

Today’s strategic realities outline a world in which many states face internal and transnational threats from terrorist organizations and other violent groups. The past five years in Iraq and Afghanistan present a number of stark lessons, but perhaps chief among them is the need to help our friends and partners provide for their own security. In the words of Defense Secretary Robert Gates, success in the Long War “will be less a matter of imposing one’s will and more a function of shaping behavior — of friends, adversaries, and most importantly, the people in between.” The Defense Department must create specifically designed force structure optimized for adviser and assistance missions to successfully engage partner nations at all levels, from the institutional to the tactical, and help them build the capacity to win the Long War.

http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2008/04/3392447

[maj dustin mitchell]

First of all, this is a great article and addresses some of our current shortcomings in fulfulling our multitude of missions across full spectrum operations.

However, I don't believe that any type of restructuring is in order. I do believe that the MITT program in its entirety can be shelved.

We already have a sufficient force structure to tackle the MITT problem and it's called the Brigade Combat Team. If we applied the BCT as a true partner to an ISF Division structure we have plenty of officers and NCOs to teach, coach and mentor that level of staff. A task force would additionally have plenty of officers and NCOs to integrate with an ISF BCT level staff as all of the officers currently being tasked in MITT roles would be sent to BCT level organizations, who would in turn tailor their task forces with the right mix of personnel. Companies may need an addition of one to two junior level officers to mentor an ISF battalion staff, but again there will be many junior officers available due to no more MITT taskings - these officers would simply be assigned directly to BCTs. It seems to me that this issue has gotten out of the hands of commanders and into the hands of the insitutional Army, which makes me uncomfortable.

How does this approach solve our current problems with MITT?

First, every unit in Iraq's focus in now on true partnership with the ISF. Although, we hear it continously emphasized, it's in our mission statements, and commander's intent; some units partner much better than others. Making the BCTs resource whatever they want this MITT to look like or in accordance with the above model, forces the partnership. We simply won't have enough forces to do operations without the Iraqis and generate the effects we are trying to achieve.

Second, MITTs are now survivable. A US company can fight and win against any type of contact they may be faced with in Iraq. They can provide their own security at combat outposts. Taking the security burden of their AOs off of their shoulders and placing it on the Iraqis is where we want to get anyway, and US forces can focus on improving ISF capabilities, providing US combat power when needed, joint patrolling, and assisting in planning rather than feeling like they alone must solve every security situation. The US Army, at some point, will eventually draw down to some reduced force level in Iraq than the present level and I would speculate that most individuals would like to be in a company sized outfit with the ISF than a twelve man team with little security, US support or survivability. Although Fort Riley has done a masterful job training these teams, they are still not trained to the level of US Special Forces who operate independently in 12 man teams.

Third, we now have a clear command and support relationship established. Although MITTs do have clear command and support relationships identified per our published combat orders, often there are dual reporting channels, interesting maintenance and logistics issues, and the relationship lends itself more to coordination rather than everyone working toward completion of the mission, following the commander's intent.

Fourth, we now have our MITTs training with and deploying from the same homestation as their BCTs because they are from the BCT. Families now have the complete support structure available to every other deployed Soldier in the BCT versus potentially being in a community where only a few members are currently deployed.

Finally, in my novice estimation, we begin to solve the junior officer retention problem. Two captains that were in my Troop that got out of the Army, ulitmately listed as one of their reasons for leaving service as "I'm going to go to MCCC, and then get tasked on a MITT. Although I don't really want to deploy again, I definitely do not want to do it as part of a MITT." If they are sent straight to BCTs, where the entire BCT's mission is basically MITT, this reason is gone. They now share in the same comradie, e'sprit de corps, and feel like a true part of the team.

The one aspect that should be retained from the MITT program is some type of "Phoenix Academy" that leaders can be sent to, to improve their abilities to conduct this type of operation. It should, however, be a short duration, individual school, where they are returned back to their BCTs to be value added in the training and execution of the mission. (Ranger school concept). Additionally, the cadre needs to be robust enough to have the ability to conduct mobile training teams for scheduled to deploy units.

Thoughts?

[The Universal Curmudgeon]

Originally Posted by maj dustin mitchell

First of all, this is a great article and addresses some of our current shortcomings in fulfulling our multitude of missions across full spectrum operations.

However, I don't believe that any type of restructuring is in order. I do believe that the MITT program in its entirety can be shelved.

We already have a sufficient force structure to tackle the MITT problem and it's called the Brigade Combat Team.

The final paragraph of the article:

"The Long War is ultimately a war of ideas. Strong partners with institutions that work toward political and economic development and reflect respect for human dignity present one of the best weapons to wage such a war. Enabling and empowering our partners through security force assistance coordinated within an interagency framework supports national policy goals and national security. Embracing a new adviser force structure and adviser education is the answer we need for the hard questions of this new era."

answers/responds best.

The "goal" is NOT simply to "produce an indigenous military that will prop up the local government - regardless of how that local government governs". The "goal" IS to "produce a local government that governs in accordance with certain levels of human rights, certainty, justice, and law so that the indigenous military will not have sufficient popular support to simply toss the local government out and take over itself whenever the leaders of the indigenous military feel the need to 'supplement their pensions' by stealing the country blind".

From a purely military standpoint, the solution you offer is a good one.

It will probably work as well in Iraq as it did in Vietnam.