The counterterrorism paradox

[Administrator]

Almost seven years after the 9/11 attacks, the primary military manifestations of America’s global war on terrorism are the seemingly interminable campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet there is little evidence that these operations are doing much to reduce the international terrorist threat to America’s homeland, people and interests.

http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2008/06/3483209

[Gary Spivey]

Brian,

Interesting article that shows some deep thought. However, in the spirit of academic discussion, I think your baseline precepts are wrong. While stats may show the US casualty rate from terrorist actions “low” compared to other conflicts, this conflict is a direct existential threat to our very way of life. The terrorist group’s goals are not changing our minds, but more simply our deaths at their hands (or subservience / conversion to Islam)

Your thesis appears to be for the US to “take a more moderate and subtle approach to a moderate and subtle threat”. While catchy, I’d ask you to demonstrate a previous war(s) in which that approach worked. I’d suggest the Korean War and the Vietnam War were probably good examples of “war in moderation” that speak for themselves in today’s history books. Warfare is not the beginning of a disagreement between nation-states, but the natural outcome of serious political disagreement; as Clausewitz said “War is an extension of politics….” Diplomacy was tried… surgical strikes were tried…. Sanctions were tried. All failed. You mention Afghanistan as an initial success that turned sour. I’d argue that it turned sour when we stopped being decisive and started moderating in our approach.

Also, you suggest to “enlist the aid of allies around the world…”. What exactly would you have those previously un-enlisted allies do? Off the top of my head, I think we had over 20 coalition partners in OIF and all of NATO in OEF. How else would you have the US execute this enlistment? The manner you approach this point suggest we have been running a solo effort in both theaters. Perhaps you would have us turn over Iraq to the Brits (who created the mess in the first place post WWI) or perhaps we could “talk” some more to the terror leaders? Interesting thought…. If you could “talk” to whomever you want, what exactly would you say? Those guys want us dead - What concession would you ask for them in exchange for us to “moderate” our approach? Perhaps our conversion to Islam; after all, that is one of two acceptable choices as laid out in the Quran.

As a final thought, I’d ask you to mention a famous and successful moderate in history – one that was faced with his own death or the death of his country. Please don’t just drop a name, mention specifics. Perhaps I am mistaken, but I can’t think of one and cite specific actions that lead to his success (survival).

Thanks again for the thought provoking perspective, even if I disagree, I enjoyed reading it.

[Detection]

This article is excellent and not quite complete.

1. The excellent part
The observation that the US should "train, advise, equip" as a guiding principle is absolutely right.......as long as the conditions to do that exist. A couple of examples of where those conditions do exist is the decades long counterinsurgency effort of Columbia where the US is in a supporting role. Also, in the Philippine counterinsurgency, the US is in a supporting role. This is where we want to be if we can manage it. This is what we want Aghanistan and Iraq to evolve to. "The Defense Dept should consider establishing a sizeable Adviser Corps dedicated to developing allied nation security forces abroad." This is exactly what Lt. Col Nagl (one of the FM 3-24 principal authors) advocates. If we had such an Adviser Corps ready in 2003 with "region-specific linguistic and cultural skills", we would have saved lots of US lives in Iraq. The few Army soldiers that could speak Arabic were invaluable in the Anbar Awakening. Imagine if we had hundreds of such troops.

2. The incomplete part
One prescription does not solve all problems. While "train, advise, equip" can solve some problems and pre-empt others, it will not solve such problems as Syria building a nuke with North Korean help, Saddam building a nuke (1981, 1991) or Iran building a nuke. While one can quibble whether this is a national or terrorist problem, it will definitely be a terrorist problem if a nuke goes off in some city in the West. While there is no one prescription to solve all nuke problems, "plain old fashion conventional force" has been used several times. The Israelis pre-empted Saddam's Osirak reactor with a conventional air attack in 1981. The US and Coalition Allies pre-empted Saddam's nuke program in 1991 with conventional air attacks followed up with post-war inspections until they were discontinued. More recently, the Israelis pre-empted the Syrian nuke program with a conventional air attack and probable cyber attack. The US conventional ground attack on Saddam in 2003 had the pleasant and unintended effect of getting Khadafy to renounce all his WMD programs which included a nuke effort. Let's recall that while Khadafy did lead a nation, he did make terrorist attacks (Pan Am-Lockerbie, French plane, German nightclub etc.).

3. A spectrum of terrorism
The US and the rest of the world are faced with a spectrum of terrorism threats. While some of these threats might be classified as "moderate and subtle" (e.g., Columbia's FARC) others are not (Khadafy, Saddam or Iran with a nuke). There is no one answer for a spectrum of different terrorist threats or even for a nuclear threat (e.g., the 6 Power talks on the North Korean nuke). Mr. Burton makes a great case for "train, advise, equip" and an "Adviser Corps" with "region-specific linguistic and cultural skills" which we should definitely pursue. However, none of those efforts would have solved the Syrian nuke problem or will solve an Iranian nuke problem. We have to prepare for a spectrum of threats and just hope that the Israelis solve the Iranian nuke problem.

[Khokar]

It is reported that the United States has escalated its war against Al Qaeda and its Taliban allies by “deploying Predator aircraft equipped with sophisticated new surveillance systems that were instrumental in crippling the insurgency in Iraq.”

It’s a story whose significance may extend well beyond the benighted hills and valleys of Pakistan’s violent Pashtun hinterlands and onto the hustings of current presidential campaign in United States. Coupled with recent report in the New York Times that President Bush signed a secret order permitting Afghanistan-based U.S. special operations forces to cross into Pakistan without Islamabad’s permission, the odds of an “October surprise” that could influence the general election have risen appreciably.

It is said that U.S. officials also told The Times that the new surveillance systems allow the operators of the unmanned Predators to locate and identify individual human targets “even when they are inside buildings. … The technology gives remote pilots a means beyond images from the Predator’s lens of confirming a target’s identity and precise location.”

The Times’ story confirms the most sensational revelation contained in Bob Woodward’s new book, “The War Within: A Secret White House History 2006-2007,” which was published last week. Woodward revealed the technology’s existence but, heeding requests from intelligence officials, declined to describe its operations except to say that it had allowed U.S. forces to locate and kill decisive numbers of senior Al Qaeda operatives and Iraqi insurgents. In what may be the book’s most controversial claim, Woodward argues that the secret technology and the so-called Anbar Awakening — in which counterinsurgency techniques developed by the Marines won over tribal leaders in that crucial Sunni-dominated province — had as much or more to do with stabilizing Iraq as the “surge” in U.S. troop numbers.

The real wild card pops up if this new surveillance technology allows U.S. forces to find and kill Osama bin Laden. Bush wouldn’t be human if he didn’t desperately want to see the Al Qaeda warlord dealt with before inauguration day 2009. Moreover, as Woodward writes, the president frequently relishes the death of individual extremists and insurgents in a way that even professional US soldiers’ find striking. ‘Since the beginning, the president Bush had viewed the war in conventional terms, repeatedly asking how many of the various enemies had been captured or killed.”

If U.S. special operations forces capture or kill Bin Laden, or if a CIA technician pushes a button and puts a Hellfire missile between his eyes, Bush will have made good on the vows he made seven years ago to bring the Al Qaeda leader to some sort of justice. In the eyes of many who supported him over the years that would allow the president to leave office with at least part of his historical reputation intact.

There also are many Republican activists who must hope that an October surprise involving Bin Laden would give McCain — unswerving supporter of the war and advocate of a muscular, hard-line foreign policy — a boost by association and they may also be able to refute the claim of Democrats who vehemently opposed going to war in Iraq, in part because it was a distraction from the conflict with the Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda, which had, after all, committed the 9/11 atrocities.

How near is drawn the claim of George W Bush, to declare his victory on the war against Terrorism before he leaves his office; It depends upon the loyal old friend Osama Bin Laden; who may appear…dead or alive and make him a victor.

Can we recall any such situation in the past history that Supreme Commander of a known superior power like US was ever found so desperate to listen, one single word: VICTORY?

Osama is a loyal friend of George W Bush. The man has never been late before. He was always there to rescue him. But this time he is being called but to the …Alter. Will Osama show up? OR … they say: No Body Runs for Ever.