Mine blindness

[Administrator]

In discussing the problems of mine warfare and the Navy, too much of the focus is on the technology and tactics of various platforms and sensors. While the tactical employment of mine-laying and mine-countermeasure (MCM) platforms is critical for the success of a major offensive or defensive naval operation, this level of war must be properly linked with the operational level; otherwise, success will be wanting.

http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2008/02/3608623

[The Universal Curmudgeon]

Originally Posted by Administrator

In discussing the problems of mine warfare and the Navy, too much of the focus is on the technology and tactics of various platforms and sensors. While the tactical employment of mine-laying and mine-countermeasure (MCM) platforms is critical for the success of a major offensive or defensive naval operation, this level of war must be properly linked with the operational level; otherwise, success will be wanting.

I would be interested in hearing Professor Vego's views on "command activated minefields" and what capacity the USN has to counter them.

By "command activated minefields" I mean minefields that are "laid (potentially) years in advance and laid surreptitiously in the course of what appear to be normal commercial operations of deep-sea freighters but where the mines are inactive until an arming signal is received".

Considering that the hulls of very few ships are inspected as the enter American ports, it is not inconceivable that non-ferrous mines (complete with long-life batteries sufficient to run their signal detection mechanisms for several years) could be laid either through underwater hatches or simply be turning off the electromagnets that secure the mines to the vessel's hull. Once dumped (sorry, laid) those mines would lie inert until their signal detection mechanisms received the arming signal, at which time they would arm themselves and proceed with their preprogrammed tasks. (Heck, they could even be fitted with non-ferrous compressed air tanks and propulsion mechanisms that would allow them to actively seek out any vessel within their (sound-powered) detection range and use the sounds of that vessel to home in on it.)

If I were planning an attack on the United States of America (or planning something that would work a whole lot better if the USN couldn't get out of harbour), the floors of all major harbours (and the channels leading to them) would be littered with such mines right now - and those mines would be disguised to look like typical "marine debris" (i.e. there would be a bunch of "old refrigerators" lying underwater beneath a whole lot of bridges and a bunch of "sunken boats" lying underwater in the channels, and a bunch of "dumped cars" near the shorelines.).

So, I guess that my question is really "Is the USN planning on looking for such mines and, if it is, does it actually have the capacity to find them?".

[ChiaPsyant]

Originally Posted by Administrator

...While the tactical employment of mine-laying and mine-countermeasure (MCM) platforms is critical for the success of a major offensive or defensive naval operation, this level of war must be properly linked with the operational level; otherwise, success will be wanting.
...

Reminds me of the account of the squad of old Acme-class MSOs deployed in the late 80s during the Iran-Iraq war, when Iran basically mined the Straits of Hormuz.

Military Sealift Command offered a converted tanker to haul all 6 vessels to the Gulf, but the Navy was hot to prove seaworthiness of the aging craft & steamed the vessels with a support ship across the Pacific. With a pit stop @Pearl Harbor, where 2 vessels crashed into each other, thus significantly reducing Am. mine countermeasures in the Gulf back then & maybe beginning this phase of mine blindness.