Essay contest: Lost lessons of counterinsurgency

[Administrator]

The book that most changed my career path was “The Army and Vietnam” by Andrew Krepinevich. Krepinevich’s book fundamentally altered the approach I took as a company commander during my second Iraq tour in 2006.

http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2008/11/3736212

[joseph.albrecht]

Niel, Congratulations on your accomplishment. Your article is a great example of how young officers throughout the Military are making good things happen everyday on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition to capturing lessons learned and updating doctrine, as you mentioned, we also need to sustain the environment that allows and encourages young officers to be adaptive and creative. Officers, even newly commissioned 2Lts, that can think on their toes, learn and grow through introspection and analysis will improve the officer corps and better prepare the military for any future adversary we face. Thanks and continued blessings for your success.
MAJ Joseph Albrecht

[oldpapajoe]

I strongly suggest the young major: Read broadly and deeply; don't read only one book. As a start, I suggest you find and read GEN Depuy's review of Krepinevich's book. GEN Depuy's (G3 for MACV and CG 1st ID) gentle review asks a reasonable question of Krepinevich: Who was going to fight the NVA that was literally overrunning South Vietnam if the US focused solely on the VC? The RVN's Army couldn't match them until later in the war (post 1972) and ultimately was defeated for a variety of reasons one of which an inability to fight a conventional enemy (the armored NVA divisions that over ran the South in 1975). The dilemma was that the NVA and the VC and the building of a legitimate RVN government all had to be done. Merely ignoring the NVA was unacceptable. Additionally, we had a draft army, and this made the effort even more troubling. Unlike today's Army, that army lost its knowledge base as the draft soldiers ETSd back to civilian life. Manning,training, and equiping two armies for Vietnam (one for counterinsurgency and hearts and minds and one for fighting a light infantry --not guerilla-army of NVA) and an Army for defending Europe and Korea was the only option. While this is an "obvious" solution on paper while at a desk in Washington DC, actually doing it, while not mobilizing the entire nation for war, was impossible. The old adage: "Nothing is impossible for the person who doesn't have to do it", comes to mind.