Starting over

[Administrator]

Among defense intelligentsia, there are few mantras more chic than that which claims the U.S. military “forgot the lessons of Vietnam.” Had it not done so, received wisdom insists, America’s armed forces would not have struggled in Iraq for so long. Powerful adherents to this theory have spawned a follow-on analog, that we must not “forget the lessons of Iraq.”

http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2009/01/3827971

[Detection]

Originally Posted by Administrator

Among defense intelligentsia, there are few mantras more chic than that which claims the U.S. military “forgot the lessons of Vietnam.” Had it not done so, received wisdom insists, America’s armed forces would not have struggled in Iraq for so long. Powerful adherents to this theory have spawned a follow-on analog, that we must not “forget the lessons of Iraq.”

http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2009/01/3827971

One of the lessons of Iraq is that "The Surge" appears to be successful and may be replicated (I hope) in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, we should always look for a less costly way. Gen Dunlap points out two successful alternatives - Philippines and Columbia. The technique used there was to help indigenous forces with advisors. Of course, in Iraq we really weren't prepared with advisors that understood the culture and the language. For example, our military has no trouble speaking Spanish in Columbia or Spanish/English in the Philippines. By contrast, the number of military Arabic speakers is abysmally low. Interpreters are a poor substitute. Gen Dunlap is right on when backing the adviser corps recommended by Lt. Col. (ret) Nagl. When studying "Lessons", let's not limit ourselves to Vietnam, Iraq but also include Philippines/Columbia. "The Surge" worked, but it would have been better to support indigenous troops with our culturally & linguistically prepared advisers plus airpower.

[Gary Spivey]

Wow... what an excellent article. The overall thesis is something I believe the Army is just starting to accept and fix. The pre-conditions for the Iraq COIN were not the actions the Army took in the 70's and beyond but due primarily to the flawed Phase IV planning and the authors mentioned rush on Baghdad -

and we could have seen it coming.

Napaleon faced it in Spain. We did in the Phillipines. Mac shaped things against COIN in Post WWII Japan. There are plenty of historical examples both ways. We just failed to be prepared for the most likely enemy COA following a rush to baghdad.

Anyway, excellent job.

[banjobailey]

We must keep in mind that it has NOT been the military who have "forgotten the lessons" of previous wars. It has been our civilian leadership who have ordered our military into situations where every lesson has been deliberately forgotten.
Our military people know, entirely, and completely, ALL the lessons. The fact that they cannot educate civilian leadership into these lessons is NOT the fault of the military.
What I hope, to God, will happen from now on out, is a military leadership at the highest levels who will NOT capitulate to political winds of the moment and simply say, "YES, Mr. President! Yes, MR. Sec. of Defense!" we CAN do everything you want with NOT enough supplies, NOT enough manpower, and NOT enough backup support to do your job.
After all, NO political person EVER has to pay the price. Only we do.