Striking a balance

[Administrator]

We are in another post-Iraq war debate about how to best posture our military investments for the future. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review will center on the critical question about the evolving character of conflict. Exactly what kinds of wars are we expecting to fight, and how should we allocate scarce time and resources to maximize readiness and deterrence while minimizing risk? The not-so-subtle groundswell of resentment, if not outright bureaucratic resentment, coming from Defense Secretary Robert Gates’ effort to allocate just 10 percent of the Pentagon’s investment account for irregular warfare suggests that this will not be a simple matter.

http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2009/07/4099782

[Ghstrdr57]

Hoffman's article is pretty well written. As I sat reading it this past weekend, I found myself thinking about what I think the future holds and which of the four categories I fit into, and which of my own assumptions needed to be challenged. While Hoffman doesn’t really offer any solutions, he does lay out some of the choices in balancing the force and a fairly clear articulation of the areas of risk that each choice offers. That is after all the crux of strategy is it not - to weigh options and make choices based on resources and risk? A good read overall.

[ChiaPsyant]

Originally Posted by Administrator

We are in another post-Iraq war debate about how to best posture our military investments for the future. ...

Since we are yet @a post-Iraq war period, isn't a lil' early for a post-war debate. The "schools-of-thought" number reads like just another detour around explaining how an intended 6-wk incursion became 6 1/2-yr occupation.

It's nice to have options, but I hope I am incorrect in imagining that our guys chose the 6-yr over the 6-wk option.

[L. McKenney]

Currently most ground units seem to have a specialized conventional war role and a generalized unconventional war role. We have armor, artillery, cavalry, infantry, and so on; however we lack the same specialization for unconventional warfare. To some extent this makes sense as conventional warfare requires relatively greater specialization while unconventional warfare requires relatively greater flexibility. But the marginal utility of each unit also having a specialized unconventional warfare role could maximize the ability for us to fight both kinds of conflicts while minimizing the jack-of-all-trades, master-of-none problem.

[pbdeignan]

When nations involve their military forces in serious operations, it tends to be as the result of a history of influences.

The autocratic structures of 1800 Europe where over restrictive and in conflict with the need of the citizens to have political influence to accompany their expanding economic progress. Inspired by the success of the American revolution, first France, and then after a spell, eventually all of Europe went through a transformation ending in the rubble of WWI and replaced by the rise of competing mass ideologies (which flowed from the previous revolutions). A war of ideologies and a technically resurgent Germany followed. In its wake the vertically integrated colonial economies were left to fall into disrepair and were replaced by emergent nationalistic movements that played out in the shadows of the primary ideological poles still remaining.

With the continued progress of technology, horizontal integration replaced vertical integration and a semi-unified Europe arose first. China changed its economic model as did Russia. Both countries will emerge as economic peers with the US alongside the EU. The wars of ideology and nationalism are largely over (the last serious nationalistic struggles that aligned ethnic blocks with statehood apparently took place in the mid 90s.) Moving into the less developed parts of the world, we see ripples of the transitions played out in native cultures. Dictatorships will eventually yield to democracies for primarily economic reasons and the backlash against the horizontal integration of the Middle East of jihadist Islam will eventually be reconciled within each country domestically.

Where does that leave us?

Technology has been the fundamental dynamic of conflict over the last 300 years and will continue. The next major threat to face us will be the results of proliferation of the ability to create WMD, particularly nuclear and missile arms races within regions as well as the probability of nuclear extortion and terrorism between asymmetric economic powers. Increasing this probability is the fact that not all democratic transformations happen apace. Combinations of dictatorships plus regional tensions plus ideological leverage are most likely to produce points of fracture in the otherwise stable nation-state system (esp. when WMD are at hand). Pakistan, Korea, Iran, and Syria are all the flash points for the next 20-30 years. Within that time it is entirely possible that we will see the release of nuclear devices on population centers (including our own).

So the military has the choice. Prepare to prevent or respond to this eventuality or continue under the present bureaucratic model. Is Northcom really prepared to deal with a smoldering (and glowing) NYC? Not today.

Is Centcom really prepared to take the hard actions against Iran that would be necessary to prevent a nuclear breakout? Better yet, is our political leadership?

Are we prepared to annihilate a nuclear state after it has (we think) dealt us a first strike? Or perhaps there is some other military option?

[ArlyneSharp]

Thank you for the informative post and keep up the good work!

[Alston.Alfred]

You must also take into consideration of your family. yes you will be away from your son most of the time, but isnt i the reason why you are working coz of him also? you want a good future for him? so its either you balance yourself, family & work..